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PREFACE
INJANUARY 2001, the Commission to Assess U.S. National Se-
curity Space Management and Organization (or "the Space
Commission") released its report on the organization and man-
agement of space activities supporting national security inter-
ests.' In the report, the Commission observed: "The U.S.
Government is increasingly dependent on the commercial space
sector to provide essential services for national security opera-
tions... includ[ing] satellite communications as well as images
of the earth useful to government officials, intelligence analysts
and military commanders. '2 While the military use of commer-
cial space systems is not in-and-of-itself a new phenomenon,' the
Commissioners' remarks serve to highlight the unprecedented
convergence of U.S. military and commercial space activities
that has taken place over the past decade and is indeed likely to
continue.4 In fact, published figures show that the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) spent approximately $600 million on
commercial satellite services during this period, and will spend
up to $2.2 billion more for commercial satellite services over the
I REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY
SPACE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION Vii (2001), available at http://www.dod.
mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter SPACE
COMM'N REPORT]. Prior to becoming Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld
chaired the Space Commission.
2 Id. at viii.
Military and commercial space capabilities first shared the same satellite in
1973, when the Navy entered into a contract with the Communications Satellite
(COMSAT) Corporation for "gapfiller" service pending the completion of its
Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system. DAVID N. SPIRES, BEYOND
HORIZONS: A HALF CENTURY OF AIR FORCE SPACE LEADERSHIP 139 n.8 (rev. ed.
1998).
4 Current Department of Defense policy states that civil and commercial space
capabilities are to be used "to the maximum extent feasible and practical." De-
partment of Defense Directive 3100.10, Space Policy, at 8, 4 (Jul. 9, 1999) [here-
inafter DoDD 3100.10]; see also U.S. SPACE COMMAND, VISION FOR 2020 7 (1997)
("Military use of civil, commercial, and international space systems will continue
to increase.") [hereinafter USSPACECOM 2020]; USAF SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BD.,
NEW WORLD VISTAS: AIR AND SPACE POWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, SUMMARY VOL-
UME iii (1995) ("The crucial importance of detailed and timely knowledge and
rapid communications to the successful pursuit of our new missions will demand
creative use of commercial systems and technologies. This will produce an inti-
mate intertwining of commercial and military applications to an extent not yet
encountered.") [hereinafter NEW WORLD VISTAS].
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next ten years.5 DoD's open recognition and extensive utiliza-
tion of the military capabilities of commercial space systems rep-
resents a dramatic shift away from the overt separation of
military and civilian programs that for decades characterized
U.S. activities in space.
As the space age dawned amidst the shadows of the Cold War,
President Eisenhower believed it was imperative that the first ar-
tificial satellite be "civilian" in order to establish the principle of
"freedom of space" and the corresponding right of unimpeded
overflight in outer space for the first-generation military recon-
naissance satellites, which were then being secretly developed to
defend against the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack by the
Soviet Union.6 Consequently, the establishment of dual military
and civilian space programs was a key element of the "open sky"
policy that guided the nation's effort at an initial foray into
space in the mid-1950s.7 Of course, with the launch of Sputnik I
by the Soviet Union in October 1957, the assumption that the
United States would be the first to launch a satellite and thereby
create a precedent for the freedom of overflight in space proved
to be mistaken. Nevertheless, the outward separation of
America's military and civilian space programs was steadfastly
preserved, 8 and thereafter became the basis for organization of
the National Space Program under the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958.'
5 Jeremy Singer, Firms to Arrange Satellite Services for Pentagon, SPACE NEWS, Feb.
19, 2001, at 19.
6 See PAUL B. STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE: U.S. POLICY, 1945-1984 35
(1985); see also SPIRES, supra note 3, at 38-40.
7 See NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, NSC 5520, DRAVr STATEMENT OF POLICY ON
U.S. SCIENTIFIC SATELLITE PROGRAM (May 20, 1955), reprinted in 1 EXPLORING THE
UNKNOWN: SELECTED DOCUMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE U.S. CIVIL SPACE PRO-
GRAM (John M. Logsdon ed., 1998) [hereinafter EXPLORING THE UNKNOWN], con-
strued in STARES, supra note 6, at 33-35, and SPIRES, supra note 3, at 40-43.
8 See The President's News Conference, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 719-32 (Oct. 9,
1957); Statement by the President Summarizing Facts in the Development of an
Earth Satellite by the United States, 1957 PUB. PAPERS 733-35 (Oct. 9, 1957).
9 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426
(1958) (unamended) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451 et seq. (2000));
see SPIRES, supra note 3, at 56-67. The Act required that responsibility and control
over U.S. space activities be vested in "a civilian agency" and created the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to fill that role; however, activities
"peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems,
military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research
and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the
United States)" remained within the purview of the Department of Defense
(DoD). National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 §§ 102, 202.
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The air of separation between U.S. military and civilian space
activities was maintained by the Kennedy administration, which,
like its predecessor, appreciated the need to downplay U.S. mili-
tary space activities while it sought to gain international accept-
ance of the right of overflight in space for reconnaissance
purposes."' As the Cold War confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union grew in intensity, the U.S. was in-
creasingly dependent on satellite reconnaissance as "a means of
penetrating Soviet secretiveness."' I So, to curtail international
criticism of American satellite reconnaissance and avoid encour-
aging Soviet countermeasures, subsequent administrations ad-
hered to a veritable code of silence concerning military space
activities, which perpetuated the split personality of the nation's
space program. 12
Such was the nature of the relationship between U.S. military
and commercial space activities until three factors ultimately
combined to move commercial space systems increasingly into
the military lexicon. First, with heightened international recog-
nition of the lawfulness of reconnaissance from space, evi-
denced by President Carter's public acknowledgement of U.S.
reconnaissance satellites in 1978,'" the secrecy and sensitivity
surrounding intelligence gathering from space eventually
abated to the point that it became an express tenet of U.S. space
II See STARES, supra note 6, at 59-71; see also SPIRES, supra note 3, at 108-12.
DEPT. OF STATE, PLANNING IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY OF OUTER
SPACE IN THE 1970s, BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PLANNING TASK I Uan. 30,
1964), quoted in STARES, supra note 6, at 94; see also COLIN S. GRAY, AMERICAN
MILI'ARY SPACE POLICY: INFORMATION SYSTEMS, WEAPON SYSTEMS AND ARMS CON-
TROL 26 (1982) ("[T]he different political characteristics of the two societies
render the U.S. far more dependent upon photographic and electronic
intelligence.").
12 On March 23, 1962, DoD imposed an information "blackout" on military
space activities and, although restrictions on public references to some parts of
the military space program were relaxed by later administrations, a moratorium
on any acknowledgement of reconnaissance from space was essentially main-
tained until 1978, when President Carter admitted that the U.S. operated satel-
lites for this purpose. STARES, supra note 6, at 65; see also Paul B. Stares, Space and
U.S. National Security, in NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE MILITARY USE OF SPACE 35,
38-39 (William J. Durch ed., 1984) [hereinafter NATIONAL INTERESTS].
13 See STARES, supra note 6, at 186 ("Carter chose the Congressional Space
Medal of Honor awards ceremony at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida on 1
October 1978, to remark that: 'Photoreconnaissance satellites have become an
important stabilizing factor in world affairs in the monitoring of arms control
agreements. They make an immediate contribution to the security of all nations.
We shall continue to develop them."').
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policy. 4 Secondly, the surge of "space commercialization" in
the 1980s, precipitated within the United States by President
Reagan's 1982 National Space Policy, 15 resulted in increased
commercial exploitation of space by both "the government en-
trepreneur" and private industry, as well as the privatization of
space technology. 16 Finally, "the absence of a known 'enemy"'
and "the reality of high costs" at the end of the Cold War (circa
1991) prompted the U.S. military to endeavor to produce more
affordable space capabilities through the military application of
commercial technologies.' 7
For the first 25 years of the space age (1957-1982), however,
space activities (including commercial space activities) were per-
formed almost exclusively by governments, acting individually or
in concert through intergovernmental agencies.'" Moreover,
'4 See White House Fact Sheet, National Space Policy (Sept. 19, 1996), available
at http://clinton2.nara.gov/wh/eop/ostp/nstc/html/fs/fs-5.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2002) ("'Peaceful purposes' allow defense and intelligence-related activi-
ties in pursuit of national security and other goals.") [hereinafter National Space
Policy (1996)]; and National Space Policy Directive No. 1, National Space Policy
(Nov. 2, 1989), available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codez/new/policy/
pddnspdl.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) ("The United States... rejects any limi-
tations on the fundamental right of sovereign nations to acquire data from
space.") [hereinafter NSPD 1]; see also National Security Decision Directive No.
42, National Space Policy (Jul. 4, 1982), available at http:// www.nasa.gov/office/
codez/new/policy/nsdd-42.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter NSDD
42]; and Presidential Directive NSC-37, National Space Policy (May 11, 1978),
available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/nsc-37.htm (last visited
Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter PD/NSC-37].
15 NSDD 42, supra note 14, at 1 (A basic goal of the 1982 policy was to "expand
United States private sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-
related activities."); see also George S. Robinson & Pamela L. Meredith, Domestic
Commercialization of Space: The Current Political Atmosphere, in 1 AMERICAN ENTER-
PRISE, THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE 1-4 (1986) ("President Rea-
gan... made it clear that he wanted an aggressive and far-sighted space program
that included a strong private sector involvement and capital investment.") [here-
inafter AMERICAN ENTERPRISE].
16 See Robinson & Meredith, supra note 15, at 1-4; see also, Art Dula, Private
Sector Activities in Outer Space, 19 INT'L LAW 159 (1985).
17 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 281.
18 See Lawrence D. Roberts, A Lost Connection: Geostationaiy Satellite Networks and
the International Telecommunication Union, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095, 1096-1097
(2000) ("For most of its history, space activity has been the province of govern-
ment... [w]hile the potential for commercial activity involving outer space was
recognized relatively early on, and there were occasionally dramatic successes,
commercial investments represented only a tiny portion of total space expendi-
tures." (footnotes omitted)); see also Christian Roisse, The Roles of International
Organizations in Privatization and Commercial Use of Outer Space, Discussion
Paper presented at the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and
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while the fact that many space systems intended for civil or com-
mercial uses had simultaneous potential military usefulness did
not go unnoticed, "the development and use of space technol-
ogy for civil and military applications [generally] occurred in
parallel" through separate military and civilian agencies.' 9 The
body of international law governing outer space and space activ-
ities, or corpus juris spatialis, was formulated in conjunction with
this background; in fact, all five of the major international trea-
ties relating to the use of outer space, including the 1963 Lim-
ited-Test-Ban Treaty,20 the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,21 the 1968
Rescue Agreement, 22 the 1972 Liability Convention, 23 and the
1976 Registration Convention, 24 were concluded during this pe-
riod, as was the 1979 Moon Treaty. 25 Thus, the "intimate inter-
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1999) (copy on file with author) ("In the early
nineteen sixties, any utilization and, above all, any commercial use of Outer
Space was not conceivable with the involvement of entities other than intergov-
ernmental agencies."); Henry Wong, Comment, 2001: A Space Legislation Odys-
sey-A Proposed Model for Reforming the Intergovernmental Satellite Organizations, 48
AM. U. L. REv. 547, 548-556 (1998) (on the factual and legal history of interna-
tional satellite organizations).
19 STEPHEN E. DOYLE, CIVIL SPACE SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY 2 (1994); see Report on Government Operations in Space (Analysis of
Civil-Military Roles and Relationships), H.R. REP. No. 445 39 (1965)
("[P] ractically every peaceful use of outer space appears to have a military appli-
cation."), quoted in SPIRES, supra note 3, at 63.
20 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (ratified by the
United States on Oct. 7, 1963, entered into force on Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter
Limited-Test-Ban Treaty].
21 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N. TS. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
22 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S. T. 7570, 672
U.N. TS. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
23 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
24 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer SpaceJan.
14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention].
25 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, G.A.Res. 34/68 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N.
Doc. A/34/664 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. The Moon Treaty entered
into force among its signatories in 1984, yet it has not been ratified by the United
States or any other major space power and so is viewed as having "no real signifi-
cance in establishing international space law." Glenn H. Reynolds, The Moon
Treaty: Prospects for the Future, 11 SPACE POLICY 115 (1995); see also OUTER SPACE:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 116 (Glenn H. Reynolds & Robert P. Merges, eds.,
2d ed. 1997) ("[A]bsent adoption by the major space powers, the Moon Treaty is
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twining" of military and commercial space applications 2' was not
a major consideration when the basic space law principles were
being established. It is therefore reasonable to question the
soundness of the legal framework pertaining to the use of
space-particularly the military use of space-and, in certain in-
stances, to military activities generally, in light of the current
doctrinal and operational confluence of U.S. military and com-
mercial space systems.
The object of this article is to shed light on some of the legal
questions raised by the increasing convergence of military and
commercial uses of space, and perhaps to highlight the inade-
quacies of the current law in dealing with this development, by
examining one area wherein the convergence of military and
commercial space activities plays a pivotal role. Specifically, this
article will address the application of the principle of self-de-
fense in space, focusing on the legality of the use of conven-
tional force in response to cyber-attack on commercial space
assets. Of course, this issue does not comprise the full panoply
of complications generated by the convergence of military and
commercial space activities; rather, it is merely a sample of the
types of issues that are likely to rise to the forefront of debate in
the immediate future.
I. INTRODUCTION
An attack on elements of U.S. space systems during a crisis or
conflict should not be considered an improbable act. If the U.S.
is to avoid a 'Space Pearl Harbor' it needs to take seriously the
possibility of an attack on U.S. space systems. The nation's lead-
ers must assure that the vulnerability of the United States is re-
duced and that the consequences of a surprise attack on U.S.
space assets are limited in their effects.27
unlikely to play a major role in the future.") [hereinafter Reynolds & Merges];
Kurt Anderson Baca, Property Rights in Outer Space, 58J. AIR L. & COM. 1041, 1069
(1993) (stating that the Moon Treaty is "not binding as a treaty" and "the claim
that it represents customary law is probably not credible"); cf. Michel Bourbon-
niere & Louis Haeck, Jus in Bello Spatiale, 25 AIR & SPACE L. 2, 4 (2000) (includes
the Moon Treaty in the six multilateral treaties that make up space law); and
BRUCE A. HURWITZ, THE LEGALITY OF SPACE MILITARIZATION 2 (1986) ("[S]pace
law... is composed of five treaties... [including] the 1979 Moon Treaty"); and
David Everett Marko, A Kinder Gentler Moon Treaty: A Critical Review of the Current
Moon Treaty and a Proposed Alternative, 8J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVrL. L. 293 (1993)
("The Moon Treaty is one of the five stars in the constellation of space law.").
26 See supra text accompanying note 4.
27 SPACE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, Executive Summary at 8-9.
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The United States is detecting the probes and scans of "hack-
ers" against DoD networks and computer systems with increas-
ing frequency. 28 In 1999 and 2000, U.S. military services
reported more than 1,300 serious "cyber-attacks," and in May
2001, the National Security Agency disclosed that "a series of
sophisticated attempts to break into Pentagon computers"
originating from a Russian Internet address (code-named
"Moonlight Maze"), continued for more than three years. 29 Tes-
tifying before Congress, John Serabian, the U.S. Central Intelli-
gence Agency's information operations issue manager, said that
the United States had identified "several countries" that are
"pursuing government-sponsored offensive cyber programs" and
went on to describe the theory behind the cyber-threat, as
follows:
[These countries] realize that, in conventional military confron-
tation with the United States, they will not prevail... [They] per-
ceive that cyber attacks, launched from within or outside the
U.S., represent the kind of asymmetric option they will need to
level the playing field during an armed crisis against the U.S.30
"Cyber-attack" is an attack on or through "cyberspace"-i.e.,
the "Global Information Infrastructure."" While the term
"cyber-attack" may have slightly different meanings in different
contexts, it is generally another word for what is described in
military jargon as "Information Warfare" (LW) or "Information
Operations"-
Those actions taken to affect an adversary's information and in-
formation systems while defending one's own information and
information systems. Information operations also include ac-
tions taken in a noncombatant or ambiguous situation to protect
one's own information and information systems as well as those
taken to influence target information and information systems...
2 SPACE COMM'N REPOR', supra note 1, at 23 ("In 1999 the number of detected
probes and scans against DoD systems was just over 22,000; in the first eleven
months of 2000, the number had grown to 26,500.").
29 Vernon Loeb, NSA Adviser Says Cyber-Assaults on Pentagon Persist with Few
Clues, WASh. PosT, May 7, 2001, at A2; see also Pentagon 'at War' with Computer
Hackers, CAN, Mar. 5,1999, available at http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/
9903/05/pentagon.hackers/index.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
-0 jack McCarthy, CIA: China, Russia Develop Cyber Attack Capability, IDG NEWS
SERV., Feb. 24, 2000, available at http://www.idg.net/crdidsearch_756369 (last vis-
ited Aug. 14, 2002).
31 See NATIONAL DEFENSE PANEL, TRANSFORMING DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY
IN THE 21sT CENTURY 90 (1997), available at http://www.dtic.mil/ndp/FullDoc2.
pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 2002) [hereinafter NDP REPORT].
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[T]he actions associated with information operations are wide-
ranging-from physical destruction to psychological operations
to computer network defense. 2
Although the 1996 National Space Policy directed that steps
be taken to protect satellites from cyber-attacks, commercial sat-
ellite operators have generally not seen a need to do this, due to
the high cost and the lack of demand from customers for pro-
tective measures.33 Hence, U.S. commercial satellites are vulner-
able to cyber-attack, and "[t] he political, economic, and military
value of space systems makes them attractive targets."34 The
growing interdependence between U.S. civilian and military
space systems further increases the likelihood that cyber-attacks
might be launched against American commercial satellites, if for
no other reason than military action directed against U.S. space
capabilities will have to target the nation's broader space infra-
structure to be successful. 5 In addition, to potential foreign ad-
versaries seeking to avoid a direct military confrontation with
the U.S. forces, whether a traditional uniformed military or
"non-traditional" adversary (such as a terrorist organization),"
the commercial sector represents the "soft underbelly" of Ameri-
can space power, which can be attacked through cyberspace in
such a way as to make determining the origin of the attack very
difficult." 7
Because the United States is more dependent on space for its
security and well-being than any other nation, 8 it is in the na-
tional interest to develop a strategy to deter and defend against
cyber-attack on U.S. commercial space systems. Already, U.S.
military analysts have called for new investments in technology
32 U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,JOINT VISION 2020 (AMERICA'S MILITARY: PREPAR-
ING FOR TOMORROW) 28-29 (2000), available at http://www.dtic.mil/jv2020/
jvpub2.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2002) [hereinafter JOINT VISION 2020]; see also
USAF FACT SHEET 95-20 (1995) (defining "Information Warfare" as "any action to
deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy's information and it's functions while
protecting Air Force assets against those actions and exploiting its own military
information operations.").
33 SPACE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
34 Id. at xii.
35 See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International
Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 272, 283-285 (1996).
-6 JOINT VISION 2020, supra note 32, at 29 ("'Nontraditional' adversaries who
engage in 'nontraditional' conflict are of particular importance in the informa-
tion domain... The perpetrators of such attacks are not limited to the tradi-
tional concept of a uniformed military adversary.").
37 James Adams, Virtual Defense, 80 FOREIGN AFF. J. 98, 105 (2001).
38 SPACE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
to enable DoD to not only defend its systems against the increas-
ing risks of cyber attack, but also to discern the origin of such
attacks, so it can deliver a commensurate response. 9 Yet, this is
not the entirety of the issue; establishing a strategy for deter-
rence is not a purely technical question. It also requires a
clearer understanding of the legal regime of self-defense with
regard to cyber-attack, particularly when it comes to the notion
of responding to cyber-attack with conventional force.4 °
The balance of this article will address this issue, looking first
at U.S. policy concerning the defense of commercial space sys-
tems and then at the legal norms governing States' use of force
in self-defense as they apply to cyber-attack.
II. U.S. POLICY ON DEFENSE OF NATIONAL
SPACE SYSTEMS
The policy of maintaining the outward separation of military
and commercial space activities, which dominated the U.S.
space program for the first twenty-five years of the space age, was
aimed at obtaining political and legal international sanction for
military space activities, primarily satellite reconnaissance.41
Nevertheless, throughout most of this same period, the United
States showed restraint in the development of "space weapons"
(i.e., weapons for use in or from space), specifically anti-satellite
(ASAT) weapons.42 American self-restraint in this regard was
based upon the belief that the United States was much more
',9 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE TECHNOLOGY
GUIDE ii (2000), available at http://www.c3i.osd.mil/org/c3is/spacesys/index.
html (last visited Aug. 20, 2002) [hereinafter DoD TECH. GUIDE]; see also NDP
REPORT, supra note 31, at 38.
40 See Adams, supra note 37, at 110.
41 See DoD TECH GUIDE, supra note 37, at iv-xv.
42 The U.S. developed two "crude" ASAT systems during this time: Project 505
or "Nike Zeus" (1963-67), a modified Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), and Project
437 or "Thor" (1964-75), a converted Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
(IRBM); however, both had "limited capabilities with severe operational con-
straints." Most notably, both systems used nuclear warheads to destroy their
targets, which meant that their use would have not only contravened the Limited-
Test-Ban Treaty, supra note 20, but would have also threatened U.S. satellites in
the vicinity of the explosion. These factors greatly reduced the usability of these
systems and their credibility as deterrents as well. STARES, supra note 6, at 80-82,
117-128; see also SPIRES, supra note 3, at 188; William J. Perry et al., Anti-Satellite
Weapons and U.S. Milita7y Space Policy: An Introduction, in SEEKING STABILIrv IN
SPACE: ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS AND TlHE EVOLVING SPACE REGIME 1, 7-9 ,Joseph
S. Nye, Jr. & James A. Schear, eds., 1987); cf. Michael Krepon, Lost in Space: The
Misguided Drive Toward Anti-Satellite Weapons, 80 FOREIGN AFF. J. 2, 3-4 (2001).
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dependent on reconnaissance from space than was its Cold War
adversary, the Soviet Union, due to the "closed" nature of Soviet
society, and that, as a consequence, the United States could not
adequately deter Soviet interference with U.S. satellites by threat
of reciprocal action.4" American policy-makers thus concluded
that developing ASAT weapons would only serve to encourage
the Soviets to do the same and thereby increase the risk of an
attack on vital U.S. space assets.44 This was the essence of U.S.
policy on the defense of its space systems until the late-1970s.
The U.S policy toward defense of space systems and, in partic-
ular, toward anti-satellite weapons, began to change during the
Ford administration. Although the Soviet Union had first be-
gun testing a satellite interceptor or "killer satellite" against
targets in space in 1968, the sudden cessation of those tests in
1971, and the climate of d6tente between the two superpowers
that prevailed in the early 1970s lent support to the U.S. policy
of restraint.45 Surely, with the United States and the Soviet
Union signing both the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty46 and the
first SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement4 7 in
May 1972, it would have been reasonable to conclude that the
Soviets had accepted the U.S. approach in toto--the two treaties
contain identical provisions which tacitly recognize the legality
of reconnaissance satellites as a means of verifying treaty compli-
ance, and prohibit any "interference" with their function.4 8
43 See STARES, supra note 6, at 51; see also sources cited supra notes 10-12.
44 See sources cited supra note 12.
45 See STARES, supra note 6, at 165, generally at 135-156 (discussing the Soviet's
ASAT weapon program).
46 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty]; see also Protocol to the Treaty
of May 26, 1972, July 3, 1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645.
47 Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinaf-
ter SALT I].
48 See ABM Treaty, supra note 46, at art. XII, 1 & 2; SALT I supra note 47, at
art. V, 1 & 2. "The meaning of the non-interference clauses was never made
explicit at the time." STARES, supra note 6, at 166-68. Stares notes two other nota-
ble agreements signed in the detente era, which are relevant to ASAT activities.
First is the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear
War between the USA and USSR, Sep. 30, 1971, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 22 U.S.T. 1590, or
"Accident Measures" Agreement, which provides: "Parties undertake to notify
each other immediately... in the event of signs of interference with [early missile
warning] systems or with related communication facilities" (Article 3). Second is
the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Measures to Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communica-
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However, the suspicious "blinding" of three U.S. satellites by an
intense beam of radiation emanating from the western part of
the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1975, and the resumption of
Soviet ASAT tests in February 1976 (after a four-year hiatus), ab-
ruptly dispelled the hope among U.S. leaders that America's
unilateral restraint in the development of anti-satellite weapons
would be reciprocated.49 Accordingly, onJanuary 18, 1977 (just
two days before leaving office), President Ford signed National
Security Decision Memorandum No. 345 (NSDM-345), directing
DoD to develop an operational ASAT capability, 5° while continu-
ing to study arms control options for anti-satellite weapons.5 1
Though implementation of NSDM 345 was left for the incoming
Carter administration, the decision nevertheless stands as "the
primary enabling act for the current U.S. ASAT programme."52
The concept of developing a credible U.S. ASAT capability,
while simultaneously pursuing limits on anti-satellite weapons,
became the basis of the Carter administration's "two-track" pol-
icy.5 '3 The argument behind the policy was both logical and per-
suasive: the prospect of a U.S. ASAT capability would serve as a
"bargaining chip" that would provide the Soviet Union with real
incentive to negotiate and give the United States leverage once
talks began, and, in the event negotiations failed, the United
States would acquire the capability to deal with military threats
in space.54 Yet despite an expressed willingness on the part of
the U.S. to exchange further ASAT restraint in return for recip-
tions Link, Sep. 30, 1971, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 22 U.S.T. 1598, or "Hot-Line Moderniza-
tion" Agreement, which incorporated the use Molniya and Intelsat satellites into
the "Hot-line" created by a 1963 treaty in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
whereby both parties agree "to take all possible measures to assure the continu-
ous and reliable operation of the communications circuits and the system of ter-
minals of the Direct Communications Link."
49 See STARES, supra note 6, at 169, 178-79.
50 As of Oct. 1, 1970, DoD moved Program 437 to "stand-by" status as a cost
saving measure, with most of the missiles and personnel being withdrawn from
Johnson Island in the Pacific, to Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. As a
result, the system's reaction time went from 24-36 hours to 30 days, which was
effectively the end of the system, although it technically remained "operational"
until it was officially deactivated on Apr. 1, 1975. See CURTIS PEEBLES, GUARDIANS:
STRATEGIc RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES 92-94 (1987); see also STARES, supra note 6,
at 127; and SPIREs, supra note 3, at 188.
51 National Security Decision Memorandum No. 345, U.S. Anti-Satellite Capa-
bilities (Jan. 18, 1977) (NSDM-345 is still classified in full), discussed in STARES,
supra note 6, at 171, 178-79.
52 STARES, supra note 6, at 179.
53 See generally id. at 180-200.
54 Id. at 183.
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rocal action from the Soviet Union, tests of Soviet ASAT systems
continued unabated throughout the Carter presidency. 55 Not
surprisingly, negotiations for comprehensive limits on ASAT
weapons were futile, reflecting the varying levels of commitment
of interested constituencies on both sides, and were eventually
abandoned in the turmoil following the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan in December 1979.56
President Carter's reputation as a nuclear weapons "disarmer"
notwithstanding, the changing perception of the Soviet threat
compelled him to take measures to improve the U.S. defensive
posture.57 On May 11, 1978, Carter issued a Presidential Direc-
tive (PD/NSC-37), which set out his National Space Policy.58 It
included the following among the "basic principles" governing
the conduct of the U.S. space program:
Rejection of any claims to sovereignty over outer space or over
celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and rejection of any limi-
tations on the fundamental right to acquire data from space.
The space systems of any nation are national property and have
the right of passage through and operations in space without in-
terference. Purposeful interference with operational space sys-
tems shall be viewed as an infringement upon sovereign rights.
The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its
right of self-defense.59
PD/NSC-37 clearly comprised a firmer, more assertive ap-
proach toward national defense of space systems, as well as an
unequivocal affirmation of the application of the right of self-
defense in outer space.6" Furthermore, although details of the
national security components of PD/NSC-37 are still classified,
55 See Announcement of Administrative Review, 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1137 (Jun.
20, 1978) ("The United States finds itself under increasing pressure to field an
antisatellite capability of its own in response to Soviet activities in this area. By
exercising mutual restraint, the United States and the Soviet Union have an op-
portunity at this early juncture to stop an unhealthy arms competition in space
before the competition develops a momentum of its own.") [hereinafter NSC
Admin. Review]; see also STARES, supra note 6, at 181, 186-192; and SPIRES, supra
note 3, at 190.
56 See STARES, supra note 6, at 192-200.
57 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 189.
58 PD/NSC-37, supra note 14, at Part 1 (portions of PD/NSC-37 are still classi-
fied); see also, NSC Admin. Review, supra note 55, at 1136 ("The United States will
pursue Activities in space in support of its right of self-defense and thereby
strengthen national security, the deterrence of attack, and arms control agreements." (em-
phasis added)), construed in STARES, supra note 6, at 185-86.
59 PD/NSC-37, supra note 14, at Part 1.
60 See discussion infra Part V.A.
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the public version of the Directive called for DoD to "[identify]
and [integrate], as appropriate, civil and commercial resources
into military operations during national emergencies," as a
means of enhancing the survivability and redundancy of U.S.
space systems. 6' Therefore, while perhaps not intended as such,
PD/NSC-37 can also be viewed as the genesis for the open rec-
ognition and extensive utilization of the military capabilities of
commercial space systems that is seen today.12
In 1981, the first year of the Reagan presidency, the new ad-
ministration initiated a comprehensive space policy review, the
results of which were contained in National Security Decision
Directive No. 42 (NSDD 42), issued on July 4, 1982.63 Although
this Directive replaced a number of the previous administra-
tion's space policy statements, including PD/NSC-37, its key
declarations were basically the same:
The United States rejects any claims to sovereignty by any nation
over outer space or celestial bodies, or any portion thereof, and
rejects any limitations on the fundamental right to acquire data
from space.
The United States considers the space systems of any nation to be
national property with the right of passage through the opera-
tions in space without interference. Purposeful interference with
space systems shall be viewed as infringement upon sovereign
rights.
The United States will pursue activities in space in support of its
right of self-defense.64
Where Reagan's space policy differed from Carter's was on
the question of arms control. Under the Reagan policy, the
United States would "continue to study space arms control op-
tions" and "consider verifiable and equitable arms control mea-
sures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment
of specific weapons systems."65 However, the nation would no
longer actively seek an agreement with the Soviet Union for
comprehensive limits on anti-satellite weapons, as was the case
61 NSC Admin. Review, supra note 55, at 1137; see also STARES, supra note 6, at
211.
' See sources cited supra notes 4-5, and accompanying text.
63 NSDD 42, supra note 14 (portions of NSDD 42 are still classified).
64 Id. at Part 1.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
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under Carter.66 In fact, the Reagan administration rejected out-
right any notion of the U.S. ASAT capability as a "bargaining
chip," adopting, instead, the mantra of "ASAT deterrence"-i.e.,
"the belief that the threat of U.S. ASAT retaliation could deter
the Soviet Union from using its own satellite interceptor. "67
Just a few days after NSDD 42 was signed, "ASAT deterrence"
made its way into U.S. military doctrine with the release of the
1982 DoD space policy, which heralded the development of an
"ASAT capability" for the primary purpose of "[deterring]
threats to [the] space systems of the United States and its al-
lies."68 Nevertheless, the main weakness of the theory of "ASAT
deterrence" remained, as it had always been, the fact that a "tit
for tat with satellites" did not make sense from an American per-
spective "because of the great asymmetry in the value of the
satellites to the two superpowers."69 Consequently, on February
4, 1987, DoD adopted a new space policy70 that theoretically
sought to address this dilemma. Under this latest policy, DoD
would "develop and deploy a robust and comprehensive anti-
satellite capability.., at the earliest possible date. '7 1 In addition,
the policy set down a doctrine of "Space System Protection":
DoD space systems will be designed, developed and operated to
ensure the survivability and endurability of their critical func-
tions at designated levels of conflict. DoD will develop and oper-
66 NSC Admin. Review, supra note 55, at 1137; see also STARES, supra note 6, at
218 ("[The Reagan administration's statement that the U.S. would continue to
'study' and 'consider' arms control options] was a lot different from stating, as
Carter had, that ASAT arms control per se was desirable."), and at 230 ("While
NSDD 42 had not been entirely dismissive of ASAT arms control, it was clear
from the administration's response to the [1981] Soviet proposal that it had no
intention of pursuing it in the immediate future.").
67 STARES, supra note 6, at 219 (emphasis added); see also White House Fact
Sheet Outlining United States Space Policy, 18 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc. 872
(Jul. 4, 1982) ("The United States will proceed with development of an antisatel-
lite (ASAT) capability, with operational deployment as a goal. The primary pur-
poses of a United States ASAT capability are to deter threats to space systems of
the United States and its allies and, within such limits imposed by international
law, to deny any adversary the use of space-based systems that provide support to
hostile military forces.").
68 See STARES, supra note 6, at 218.
69 Id. at 219.
70 Department of Defense Space Policy, Unclassified (Mar. 10, 1987), available
at http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/defense/87memo.htm (last visited
Aug. 23, 2002) [hereinafter DoD Space Policy (1987)]. The official version of
the policy was signed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger on February 4, 1987,
and remains classified.
71 Id. at 5.
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ate space systems which balance capability and survivability to
deter attacks by creating a dilemma for adversary attack planners
by responding to these attacks with both space and terrestrial
force responses.72
The new DoD policy thus bolstered "ASAT deterrence" by
substituting the "tit for tat with satellites" for an array of poten-
tial military responses to an attack on U.S. space systems, to in-
clude "terrestrial force," which could, for example, entail the
use of conventional force against the attacker's satellite ground
stations, command and communications nodes, or launch
systems.73
The Reagan philosophy of "ASAT deterrence," and the corre-
sponding goal of developing and deploying an anti-satellite ca-
pability, were seemingly well entrenched as fixtures of U.S.
space policy with the introduction of National Space Policy Di-
rective No.1 (NSPD 1) in 1989:
The United States will conduct those activities in space that are
necessary to national defense. Space activities will contribute to
national security objectives by (1) deterring, or if necessary, de-
fending against enemy attack; (2) assuring that forces of hostile
nations cannot prevent our own use of space; (3) negating, if
necessary, hostile space systems; and (4) enhancing operations of
United States and Allied forces.
* * 4*
Space Control: The DoD will develop, operate, and maintain en-
during space systems to ensure its freedom of action in space.
This requires an integrated combination of anti-satellite,
survivability, and surveillance capabilities .... The United States
will develop and deploy a comprehensive [ASAT] capability with
programs as required and with initial operations capability at the
earliest possible date. 4
However, the force of NSPD 1 was severely diminished by the
fact that, in 1988, concerns over cost overruns and the ongoing
arms race with the Soviet Union prompted Congress to ban fur-
ther testing of the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV)-an air-
launched heat-seeking anti-satellite weapon, which had been in
development since 1977 and was intended to provide the
72 Id.
73 "Terrestrial forces" include air, land, and sea forces. See OFFICE OF TECHNOL-
oGY ASSESSMENT, 99TH CONG., ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS, COUNTERMEASURES, AND
ARMS CONTROL, SUMMARY 14 (1985).
74 NSPD 1, supra note 14.
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United States with an operational ASAT capability.7" The U.S.
Air Force subsequently cancelled the program, and thus the
United States remained without a dedicated anti-satellite system
in operation.
With the end of the Cold War and subsequent breakup of the
Soviet Union, the Reagan-era rationale of pursuing an ASAT ca-
pability to deter Soviet ASAT attacks no longer applied.76 Even
so, the Gulf War had provided U.S. leaders with a convincing
demonstration of the value of satellite reconnaissance and the
importance of denying it to one's enemies; hence, American
ASAT weapons development continued.7 7 Still, there was con-
siderable debate over the necessity, feasibility, and cost-effective-
ness of such weapons; consequently, through the mid-1990s, the
United States' anti-satellite program remained a "technology
base" program only, with the limited objective of "developing
technologies as security against potential future threats."7
The nation's policy on space system defense exhibited a simi-
lar ambivalence during this period. Installed in 1996, the new
"National Space Policy" dropped the express call for deploy-
ment of an anti-satellite system (and, indeed, any mention of the
word anti-satellite altogether) -instead, DoD would simply
"maintain the capability to execute. . . space control.""' The
document further provided:
National security space activities shall contribute to U.S. national
security by (a) providing support for the United States' inherent
75 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 261; see also Paul B. Stares, The Threat to Space Systems,
in THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY IN SPACE 38, 50-52 (Kenneth N. Luongo & W.
Thomas Wander eds., 1989) ("For fiscal 1985, Congress mandated that no more
than three tests against a target in space could take place, and then only after the
president had certified that the United States was endeavoring in good faith to
negotiate an ASAT arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The next year
it prohibited testing against objects in space, a ban it later extended into fiscal
1987.").
71 See Krepon, supra note 42, at 4-5 (discussing the Reagan administration's
support of antisatellite weapons).
77 SPIRES, supra note 3, at 261; see also William B. Scott, ASAT Test Stalled by
Funding Dispute, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jul. 1, 1996, at 59 (discussing the
Army's kinetic energy anti-satellite); William J. Broad, In Era of Satellites, Army Plots
Way to Destroy Them, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, at C1, C8 ("Congress has... fi-
nanced the [Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite Program] at a significant level for two
years and is expected to continue to do so, citing a growing need for the military
to be able to blind unfriendly eyes in orbit... [S]aid Senator Robert C. Smith...
'If Saddam Hussein had [satellite reconnaissance] technology during the gulf
war [sic], he could have done a lot of damage."').
78 SPIREs, supra note 3, at 261-62.
79 National Space Policy (1996), supra note 14.
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right of self-defense and our defense commitments to allies and
friends; (b) deterring, warning, and if necessary, defending
against enemy attack; (c) assuring that hostile forces cannot pre-
vent our own use of space; (d) countering, if necessary, space
systems and services used for hostile purposes; [and] (e) enhanc-
ing operations of U.S. and allied forces.
[T]he United States will develop, operate and maintain space
control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space and, if
directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries. These ca-
pabilities may also be enhanced by diplomatic, legal or military
measures to preclude an adversary's hostile use of space systems
and services. The U.S. will maintain and modernize space sur-
veillance and associated battle management command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence to effectively de-
tect, track, categorize, monitor, and characterize threats to U.S.
and friendly space systems and contribute to the protection of
U.S. military activities."
While the phrase "space control capabilities [and] military
measures" is arguably a euphemism for "space and terrestrial
force," the 1996 policy left the question of the use of force in
response to an attack on U.S. space assets awash in verbiage. By
the end of the decade, however, the expanded commercial use
of space, and the growing dependence of the military on the
commercial space sector to provide essential services, gave rise
to renewed concern over the vulnerability of the nation's space
systems to attack.81 So, in 1999, DoD promulgated its current
space policy, which clarified the issue:
Space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which mili-
tary activities shall be conducted to achieve U.S. national security
objectives. The ability to access and utilize space is a vital na-
tional interest because many of the activities conducted in the
o Id.
' See SPACE COMM'N REPOR-, supra note 1, Executive Summary, at 8 ("The rela-
tive dependence of the U.S. on space makes its space systems potentially attrac-
tive targets. Many foreign nations and non-state entities are pursuing space-
related activities. Those hostile to the U.S. possess, or can acquire on the global
market, the means to deny, disrupt or destroy U.S. space systems by attacking
satellites in space."); see a/soJOINT VISION 2020, supra note 32, at 30 ('[O]ur ever-
increasing dependence on information processes, systems, and technologies adds
potential vulnerabilities that must be defended."); NDP REPORT, supra note 31, at
38 ("[As] [m]ilitary competitors... seek ways to reduce our current advantages
[in space]... business will turn to government for protection... [and] as the
'flag follows trade,' our military will be expected to protect U.S. commercial
interests.").
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medium are critical to U.S. national security and economic well-
being. Ensuring the freedom of space and protecting U.S. na-
tional security interests in the medium are priorities for space
and space-related activities. U.S. space systems are national prop-
erty afforded the right of passage through and operations in
space without interference, in accordance with [the National
Space Policy (1996)]. Purposeful interference with U.S. space
systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign
rights. The U.S. may take all appropriate self-defense measures, includ-
ing . . the use of force, to respond to such an infringement on U.S.
rights.8 2
Thus, under the new DoD policy, it is now clear that the
United States construes the "inherent right of self-defense" as
not only allowing the use of military force in response to attacks
on the nation's military space systems, but in response to attacks
against U.S. commercial interests and investments in space as
well.
The advent of the cyber-attack threat introduces a new dy-
namic to the concept of satellite defense that U.S. policymakers
must now address. The concept of a deterrence regime is once
more gaining currency, not just for outer space, but for "cyber-
space" too. 4 Military planners have advocated increased tech-
nology investments to give U.S. forces the ability to determine
the nature and origin of a cyber-attack, so that they can take
steps to mitigate its effect and attack the source."5 Yet, the legal-
ity of the use of force in response to a cyber-attack on commer-
cial space systems remains open to question.86 Resolving this
issue requires an evaluation of the cyber-attack threat within the
context of the law governing resort to armed conflict gener-
ally-the jus ad bellum.
III. THE LAW GOVERNING RESORT TO ARMED
CONFLICT (US AD BELLUM)
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Modern jus ad bellum-which corresponds with the era of the
Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) and the Charter of
82 DoDD 3100.10, supra note 4, 4.1-4.2, at 6 (emphasis added).
83 See USSPACECOM 2020, supra note 4, at 4 ("[In the 21st century]... space
forces will ... protect military and commercial national interests and investment
in the space medium due to their increasing importance.").
84 Adams, supra note 37, at 104.
85 See NDP REPORT, supra note 31, at 38-41; see also sources cited supra note 39.
86 See Adams, supra note 37, at 110.
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the United Nations (1945)-is distinguished by the establish-
ment of the illegality of resort to war by States as "the basic
norm.'" Prior to this, the jus ad bellum was characterized by a
strong presumption of the legality of war as "an instrument of
self-interest, and as a form of self-help," which dated back to
antiquity."" This is not to say that the resort to war was unregu-
lated; to the contrary, virtually every advanced civilization has
had rules governing the initiation of war."9 Indeed, "[a]s early
as the Egyptian and Sumerian wars of the second millenium
[sic] B.C., there were rules defining the circumstances under
which war might be initiated.""0
The advent of Christianity marked the beginning of an era in
which the question of war was dealt with from a moral perspec-
tive;' "[thus] there originated with St. Ambrose (A.D. 340-397)
the conception of the Roman Empire as the basis of the just
peace, and the first signs of the justice of war."9 2 The notion
that the "right of war" (jus belli) was limited, in so far as there
were just and unjust wars and unjust wars were forbidden, ' was
subsequently "elaborated and given authority in the Christian
87 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND [HE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 1
(1963).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 3-4; see also I THE LAW Or WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3-5 (Leon
Friedman ed., (1972) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR]; ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROB-
ERTJ. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 12-13 (1993) (discussing
the writings of Aristotle).
90 LAw OF WAR, supra note 89, at 3.
91 See AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 14; see alsoJose-Luis Fernandez-Flores,
Use of Force and International Community, 111 Mu. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). In the late
Roman Empire, Christian religious doctrine had become widespread and en-
meshed with the secular power of Rome; therefore, Christian theologians and
canonists were compelled to reconcile the pacifist and anti-militaristic principles
of the early Church with the needs of the emerging Christian State. See BROWN-
LIE, supra note 87, at 5; see also LAw OF WAR, supra note 89, at 6; AREND & BECK,
supra note 89, at 13; Fernandez-Flores, supra, at 3 ("On the one hand, authors
like Tertulian [A.D. 160-240] and Lactantius [died c. A.D. 330] declared them-
selves in favor of absolute non-violence and accordingly stated that all wars were
unjust. The former also maintained that the existence of armed forces was incon-
sistent with the Christian faith, and he was accused of heresy. On the other hand,
no authoritative text rejected outright the possibility of Christians taking part in a
war. In fact, many Christians served in the Roman legions and were nevertheless
still considered saints."); cf. Chris afJochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation
of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT'L LJ. 49, 60 n.39
(1994) ("As the Church grew to exercise state power in Europe, it abandoned its
early commitment to pacifism.").
92 Fernandez-Flores, supra note 91, at 4; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 5.
93 Fernandez-Flores, supra note 91, at 4.
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world by St. Augustine (A.D. 354-430)." " The just war doctrine
(as it is known) would serve as the basis for jus ad bellum through
the end of the Middle Ages.95
Later, as the feudal political structure owing allegiance to the
Pope and Emperor began to give way to a system of sovereign
national States,9 6 the laws of war were reexamined from a 'jurid-
ical-secular" point of view, "shifting the main argument from the
justice or injustice of war to the... lawfulness or unlawfulness of
war."97 Prominent scholastics, jurists and theologians of this pe-
riod concluded that, by virtue of the sovereign authority vested
in the State, any sovereign nation could lawfully declare war.
They further opined that the exclusive power of the sovereign
ruler to decide on the necessity of war was such that war was
justified, so long as the ruler, acting in good faith, judged it to
be so-even if objectively justice lay with the other party!9' This
"probabilist" theory99 was eventually woven into the doctrine of
"positivism," which prevailed throughout the Age of Enlighten-
94 BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 5. Underlying Augustine's construct of the lust
war" was the notion that three things were necessary for a war to be considered
just: first, war could only be waged by authority of a sovereign; secondly, just
cause was required (i.e., some fault on the part of those who were attacked); and
thirdly, war had to be undertaken with rightful intentions (i.e., with a genuine
desire forjustice, as opposed to hate or revenge). See LAw OF WAR, supra note 89,
at 6-7; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 6 (quoting St. Thomas Aquinas (c.
1225-74) in Summa Theologica, on the teachings of St. Augustine); AREND & BECK,
supra note 89, at 14; cf M.H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages 66
(1965) (discussing the work of Raymond of Pennaforte, who applied the opin-
ions of Augustine in Summa de Poenitentia (1603) and identified five prerequisites
for a just war).
95 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 5-18; AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 15-19;
see also LAw OF WAR, supra note 89, at 6-15; Fernandez-Flores, supra note 91, at 4
("The doctrine of Saint Augustine basically shaped all of the medieval doc-
trines."); cf. afJochnick & Normand, supra note 91, at 61 ("The laws of war re-
mained tied to religious particularism until the Enlightenment.").
96 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 10-13; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at
15-17 (discussing the emergence of the state system and the doctrine of
sovereignty).
97 Fernandez-Flores, supra note 91, at 5 ("[Publicists] detheologized the notion
of just war."); see also LAw OF WAR, supra note 89, at 11; afJochnick & Normand,
supra note 91, at 61 ("[T]he 'publicists' helped shift the source of legal authority
from God to reason"), 61 n.44 ("The early publicists.., continued to use the 'just
war' framework but universalized its principles.").
98 See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 7-13; Fernandez-Flores, supra note
91, at 5-6.
99 "This theory has been described as 'probabilism'... [because] of its relation
to casuistic method." BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 11.
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ment " "° and held that "since states could be bound by no higher
law, the only law that could exist was that which they created by
their consent... through treaties, customs, and general princi-
ples."'' In effect, this meant that under international law States
enjoyed a sovereign right to go to war-a right that was essen-
tially unrestricted"' -and the just war doctrine was thereby rele-
gated to "the realms of morality and propaganda.' '1 3
The "unbridled ferocity" of modern warfare' 4 and the in-
creased risk posed to the civilian population of the "nation-at-
arms" in the nineteenth century, led to the first international
conferences aimed at codifying the laws and customs governing
wartime conduct (jus in bello). °5 But these early attempts to cre-
ate laws governing the conduct of war could not overcome "the
enduring power of military necessity," and the resulting regula-
tions "inevitably collapsed into deliberate vagueness.',' 6 Mean-
while, the jus ad bellum remained characterized by the unlimited
right to wage war as an attribute of the sovereign State. 10 7
Finally, by the beginning of the twentieth century, new trends
favoring peaceful settlement of disputes began to emerge, in-
cluding the view of war as "a judicial procedure," wherein war
was "a means of last resort" available only after recourse to
'00 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 10-18; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 89,
at 15-17.
10' AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 16.
102 Id. at 17 ("The only real qualification of this right to institute war that was
accepted by states during this period was the requirement that war be declared.
Hence, a state simply declared war, and it was lawful." (footnotes omitted)); see
also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 12; Fernandez-Flores, supra note 91, at 6 ("[W]ar
was turned into ajuridical institution in conformity with natural law but devoid of
moral considerations .... In short, there were no restrictions at all on war.").
103 BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 14 ("[Between] 1648 to 1815... in deference to
public opinion governments frequently took pains to advance reasons for declar-
ing war which would give the action some colour of righteous-ness."); cf AREND &
BECK, supra note 89, at 16-17 (the "emergence of the state system" and "the doc-
trine of sovereignty" served to "supplant thejust war concept as the predominant
legal approach to the jus ad bellum.").
114 JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITA-
RIAN LAW 24 (1985), quoted in afJochnick & Normand, supra note 91, at 63.
105 AfJochnick & Normand, supra note 91, at 63, 66-68; see Declaration Re-
nouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grams
Weight (Saint Petersburg Declaration) (1868), and International Declaration
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels Conference) (1874), re-
printed in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, at 25-34, 101-103 (Dietrich Schindler &
Jirf Toman eds., 1988).
106 afJochnick & Normand, supra note 91, at 68.
107 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, passim; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at
17, 19.
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peaceful means of settlement had failed."' 8 Attempts by the
Hague Peace Conferences of 1899109 and 1907110 to restrict the
freedom of States to resort to war reflected this view. Although
while international diplomatic efforts reflected the increasing
favor shown to peaceful means of settling disputes,"' as well as
movement toward the modern view of war as not simply a pri-
vate duel between States, but a matter of international concern,
they did not alter the view of war as "a normal mode of enforc-
ing a State's legal rights."' 1 2 Consequently, in the period prior
to 1914, the State's right to resort to war, as a form of self-help,
remained unrestricted by customary international law.' The
drawbacks of this system became all too obvious with the onset
of the First World War.
B. MODERN Jus AD BELLUM
1. League of Nations Covenant (1919)
The First World War (1914-1918) wrought immense destruc-
tion, exacting a staggering toll on human life; in fact, twice as
many people were killed during World War I than had been
killed in all wars combined from 1790-1913. "' Not surprisingly,
the goal of the delegates to the Paris Peace Conference assem-
bled in Versailles in the spring of 1919 was to ensure that such a
war could never happen again. "' Thus, the League of Nations
108 BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 19, 21 ("In state practice this sometimes ap-
peared as a substantial though perhaps somewhat formal qualification of the
right to resort to war.").
-0, The First Peace Conference sought to institutionalize procedures for the
peaceful settlement of disputes in the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, Jul. 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, 1 Bevans 230.
H0 The Second International Peace Conference (1907) produced three more
treaties: the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
(Hague I), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, 1 Bevans 577, which revised the 1899
Convention by expounding upon the means and methods for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes; the Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment
of Force for the Recovery of Contract Debts (Hague II) [also known as the Porter
Convention], Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607, which sought to outlaw
"forcible self-help" by means short of war; and the Convention Relative to the
Opening of Hostilities (Hague III), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 1 Bevans 619,
which required that war not start without a warning.
I See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 22.
112 SeeJULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 297 (Rine-
hart & Co. 1954).
"13 See sources cited supra note 107.
"4 AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 19.
115 Id.
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Covenant, established as part of the Treaty of Versailles
(1919),6 represented the first serious attempt to restrain the
right of States to resort to war. 17
Under the League of Nations Covenant, signatories agreed to
submit any dispute that was likely to "rupture" international
peace to arbitration or, alternatively, to the League Council for
consideration."' 8 Members of the League further agreed that
once a decision on the matter was issued, either in the form of
an arbiter's award or the unanimous recommendations of the
Council, they would not resort to war against any party that com-
plied with the terms of the award decision or the recommenda-
tions in the Council's report.1 "' Even where a party did not
comply with the decision or recommendations, the Covenant
imposed a "cooling off' period whereby Members agreed not to
resort to war for at least three months after the decision or re-
port was issued. 120 Resort to war by a Member in violation of the
Covenant's provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes
subjected the violator to collective sanctions. 21
While not imposing an outright ban on war, 122 the Covenant
altered the jus ad bellum in two important ways. First, the imposi-
tion of procedural restraints on the liberty of State's to resort to
1 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), June 28, 1919, arts. I-
XXVI, 2 Bevans 43 [hereinafter LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT]. Entered into
force as between the contracting parties on June 10, 1920 (the United States was
not a party).
17 See STONE, supra note 112, at 299.
11 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 114, art. XII & XV.
1 Id. art. XIII & XV. Under Article XII, decisions of arbiter's were to be is-
stied within "a reasonable time," while the report of the Council was to be issued
within six months after the submission of the dispute.
120 Id. art. XII.
121 Id. art. XVI.
22 Article X provided, in part: "Members of the League undertake to respect
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of all Members of the League." While the provision ap-
pears to constitute a general prohibition of "aggression," the consensus among
scholars is that such an interpretation was contradicted by other provisions which
allowed recourse to war (e.g., Article XV) and that the Covenant did not outlaw
war per se. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 112, at 299-300 ("[The Cove-
nant]. . imposed on the liberty to resort to war certain restraints largely of a
procedural nature. [It] was not, however, a complete prohibition."); BROWNLIE,
supra note 87, at 56 ("[The Covenant] must be interpreted... on the assumption
that the right to go to war recognized by the customary law still existed."); Id. at
66 ("The general presumption was that war was still a right of sovereign states
although signatories to the Covenant were bound by that instrument to submit to
certain procedures of peaceful settlement."); see also INGRID DEITER DE Lupis,
TiHE LAW OF WAR 54-55 (1987) (" [W]ar was not outlawed by the Covenant... [It]
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war was itself a significant derogation from customary law, which
had for centuries maintained the unrestricted right to wage
war.' 21 Second, the notion that resort to war in contradiction of
the Covenant's provisions would subject the violator to interna-
tional sanction 2 helped foster a presumption against the legal-
ity of war as a means of self-help. 25
At the same time, the practical force of the Covenant was di-
minished to the extent that there were "gaps" in its provisions,
by which Members could continue to legally resort to war or
employ forcible means short of war. For example, the Covenant
left open the possibility of Members resorting to war against a
party that did not comply with the decision once the three-
month "cooling off' period had expired, and placed no restric-
tions on the Members resorting to war in situations where no
decision on their case could be reached. 26 Furthermore, since
the Covenant's prescriptions referred only to "war," they argua-
bly did not apply to the use of force outside the context of a
formal "state of war." 127
2. Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928)
Attempts to clarify and expand the jus ad bellum continued in
earnest in the period after the League of Nations Covenant was
instituted. Almost immediately, League Members undertook to
close the "gaps" in the provisions of the Covenant through sup-
plementary agreements, such as the 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance s12 and the 1924 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of
restricted the right of the members of the [League of Nations] to resort to war.");
AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 21-22.
123 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 56; see also supra sec. III A.
124 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 114, art. XVI.
125 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 57-58 ("[T]he Covenant nourished the view
that the use of force was illegal not only when directed to conquest and unjusti-
fied acquisition but also as a means of enforcing rights. Self-help was restricted;
war was no longer to be the 'litigation of Nations.'").
126 LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 114, at art. XII, XV. In cases
where a decision could be reached, "Members... reserve[d] to themselves the
right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of
right and justice." Id. art. XV.
127 "[U]ses of force short of war would be regulated by the same regime that
existed during the positivist period." AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 22; see also
BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 38-40 (discussing the definition and significance of a
"state of war").
128 Treaty of Mutual Assistance (Draft), LEAGUE OF NATIONS OJ. Spec. Supp. 7,
at 16 (1923). The treaty defined "aggressive war" as an international crime (art.
I), but did not place any restrictions on the resort to war beyond those imposed
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International Disputes (the Geneva Protocol); 21' however,
neither of these treaties was successful. Similar efforts followed
at both the regional and international levels, but these met with
only minimal success.' 30 Finally, in 1928, there came a "decisive
turning point in the development away from the freedom to
wage war and towards a universal and general prohibition of
war," ' 3 1 with the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Re-
nunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy.
3 2
The Kellogg-Briand Pact provided:
Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to
war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce
it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one
another.
Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the settle-
ment or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or
of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them,
shall never be sought except by pacific means.
by the Covenant. Rather, it clarified the fact that war could in fact be used to
enforce settlement decisions reached in accordance with the term of Covenant,
wherein it stated: "A war shall not be considered as a war of aggression if waged
by a State which is a party to a dispute and has accepted [the decision]... against
[a party] which has not accepted it."
129 Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, League of Na-
tions 0.J. Spec. Supp. 23, at 498 (1924). The Protocol made "war of aggression"
an international crime (art. II), and prohibited the resort to war except in self-
defense or in the case of collective enforcement measures, but never entered into
force.
130 E.g., Locarno Treaties of 1925-The Treaties of Locarno were a series of
agreements entered into by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Britain,
Italy, and Poland in Locarno, Switzerland, in 1925, which were intended to pro-
mote peace and security in Western Europe within the framework of the League
of Nations. Under the first of the Locarno treaties, France, Germany, and
Belgium agreed not to attack, invade, or resort to war against each other, subject
to exceptions for self-defense, collective enforcement measures under Article
XVI of the Covenant, and certain actions under Article XV, paragraph 7, of the
Covenant. But the treaties involving Poland and Czechoslovakia did not offer the
same assurances to the countries on Germany's eastern borders. Plus, there was
no Locarno treaty pertaining to Eastern Europe. See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at
70-74 (discussing the 1925 Locarno Treaties and other developments).
131 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 110 (Bruno Simma
ed., 1994) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION
AND SELF-DFENSE 81 (3rd ed. 2001) (describing the Kellogg-Briand Pact as "a
watershed... in the history of the regulation of the use of inter-States force").
132 Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand
Peace Pact or Pact of Paris), Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2 Bevans 732, [hereinaf-
ter the Kellogg-Briand Pact]. The United States ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact
on Jan. 17, 1929.
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As is clear from the text, unlike the League of Nations Cove-
nant, which permitted recourse to war under certain circum-
stances, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was, on its face, an unqualified
renunciation of war (Article I), coupled with an affirmative duty
to resolve disputes by peaceful means (Article II). Moreover,
unlike the other similar treaties that preceded it (e.g., the Ge-
neva Protocol), the Kellogg-Briand Pact was accepted by virtu-
ally every State then in existence and incorporated into general
customary international law.'33 Thus, with the adoption of The
Kellogg-Briand Pact there was, "for the first time, a general pro-
hibition on war... subject only to the right of self-defense."' 134
This is not to suggest that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was a sort
of panacea, for it also had its shortcomings. Perhaps the most
glaring weakness of the Pact was that it outlawed only "war," and
thereby not only permitted unrestricted recourse to measures
short of war, but also left room for States to circumvent applica-
tion of the Pact by engaging in war-like activities under some
other name.'35 Beyond this, there were other deficiencies and
ambiguities in the language of the Pact that also made its prohi-
193 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 75; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at
23; COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 110-11 ("Only a number of Latin American
States remained outside the Pact, but they became bound by the Saavedra-Lamas
Treaty [of 1933]. . .which. . . [was] worded almost identically to Art. I of the
Kellogg-Briand Pact. . . [and] covered their relations with third states."); cf
STONE, supra note 112, at 300 (The Pact "came into force for virtually all States in
the world, [but] still left the customary liberty to resort to war unaffected in [cer-
tain] respects."). The Kellogg-Briand Pact is still in force. See BROWNLIE, supra
note 87, at 75, 113-14; AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 22; Cf COMMENTARY, supra
note 131, at 111 (the provisions of the Pact are still valid today as part of general
customary international law).
134 COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 110; see also IDENTIC NOTES OF THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF AUSTRALIA, BELGIUM, CA-
NADA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, INDIA, THE IRISH FREE
STATE, ITALY, JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, POLAND, SOUTH AFRICA (Jun. 23, 1928), re-
printed in 22 AM. J. INT'L. L., Supp., 109 (1928) ("There is nothing in the [Kel-
logg-Briand Pact] which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self defense.
That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty");
BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 81 (The treaty contained no reference to self-de-
fense, but "signature was conditional on acceptance by signatories of reservations
of the right of self-defense set out in the diplomatic exchanges prior to signature
of the treaty"). The treaty was conspicuously silent with regard to what actions
gave rise to the exercise of the right of self-defense.
135 See STONE, supra note 112, at 300; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at
23; COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 111; but seeBROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 76-80,
84-88 (discussing the meaning of "war" as evidenced by state practice after adop-
tion of the Pact, Prof. Brownlie cites several instances in which breaches of the
Pact were alleged by various States in absence of a formal state of war).
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bition of war less than complete. For example, under Article I,
signatories to the Pact renounced war as "an instrument of na-
tional policy." Hence, by implication, war carried out "in pur-
suit of religious, ideological, and similar (not strictly national)
goals" might be deemed legal. 36 War undertaken pursuant to
the authority of an international organization (e.g., under Arti-
cle XVI of the Covenant), or otherwise to enforce international
obligations (e.g., a collective action taken against signatories vio-
lating the Pact), was also exempted from the prohibition' 3 7-
that is, "[i]nasmuch as Article I of the Pact forbade war only as
an instrument of national policy, war remained lawful as an in-
strument of international policy."' "8 In addition, since the signa-
tories renounced war only "in their relations with one another,"
resort to war was still lawful as an instrument of national policy
in relations with non-signatories.I39
In the end, the Kellogg-Briand Pact did little, if anything, to
prevent the spread of hostilities in the decade leading up to the
Second World War.'40 However, as has been the case through-
out history, it seems that this had more to do with "the enduring
power of military necessity," than it did with any so-called "gaps"
in the jus ad bellum.14' In any event, failure of the Pact to pre-
vent war notwithstanding, it still had a considerable effect on
State practice,'42 and formed the basis for a rule of customary
international law that prohibited the use of force as an instru-
ment of national policy, except in cases of self-defense. 43 This
rule became "the heart" of the United Nations Charter. 144
'36 See AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 23-24.
137 Although the Kellogg-Briand prohibition of war was not linked to a system
of sanctions, vis-d-vis the League of Nations Covenant (art. XVI), the preamble to
the Pact declared that any State that resorted to war in violation of its provisions
would "be denied the benefits furnished by... [the] Treaty." See STONE, supra
note 112, at 300; BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 89-91; COMMENTARY, supra note 131,
at 111.
138 DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 79 (emphasis added).
"19 See STONE, supra note 112, at 300; DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 80. In prac-
tice, however, the Pact effectively had universal application. See supra text accom-
panying note 133.
141 See STONE, supra note 112, at 300; AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 24.
141 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 75-80.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 110-11; see also AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 24-25.
144 See Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4)
are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 Am. J. INT'L. L. 544 (1971) (discussing the significance
of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter), quoted in COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at
111.
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3. Charter of the United Nations (1945)
The United Nations Charter was adopted at the United Na-
tions Conference of International Organization in San Fran-
cisco in June 1945.145 With the death toll of the Second World
War surpassing that of the First World War by five-fold, 46 dele-
gates to the U.N. Conference gravely expressed their determina-
tion "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in [their] lifetime [had] brought untold sorrow to
mankind."'47 To this end, the Charter established the United
Nations, the foremost purpose of which is set forth in Article
1 (1), as follows:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggres-
sion or other breaches of the peace.' 48
In addition to creating the organs of the United Nations, the
Charter consolidates and reinforces certain customary norms re-
lated to "the behavior of States, especially with respect to the use
of force."' 49 Two provisions of Article 2 stand out in this regard.
The first is Article 2(3), which reaffirms the duty of States to
resolve international disputes by peaceful means. 50 But, by far,
the most important provision of the Charter along these lines is
the general prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4),
which states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or politi-
145 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3 Bevans 1153, [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER].
Ratified by the United States on Aug. 8 1945, entered into force on Oct. 24, 1945.
146 "The estimate has been made that while World War I caused 10 million
deaths, of which 500,000 were civilians, World War II caused 50 million, of which
24 million were civilians." Howard S. Levie, When Battle Rages, How Can Law Pro-
tect?, 24 14Tt-i HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM (John Carey ed., 1971), reprinted in Levie on
the Law of War, 70 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES 129, 148
(Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998).
147 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, at Preamble.
148 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. I, 1.
149 AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 29; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 112-
13.
150 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 2, 3, states: "All Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."
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cal independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
15 1
Article 2(4) thus rectifies the major flaw of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact;15 2 it not only outlaws "war," as did Kellogg-Briand, but any
use of armed force (or even the threat of such force). 53 Hence,
even uses of force "short of war" are prohibited. 54 The Charter
also rejects Kellogg-Briand's ambiguous "national policy"
formula, as well as any language limiting application of the pro-
hibition on the use of force to treaty signatories. Article 2(4)
forbids the use of force by U.N. Members against any State-
Member or non-Member-for whatever reason, unless it falls
within one of two major exceptions explicitly granted by the
Charter: (1) enforcement actions authorized by the U.N. Secur-
ity Council; or (2) the right of individual and collective self-
defense. 15
5
151 Id. art. 2, 4.
152 "When the Charter of the United Nations was drafted in San Francisco, in
1945, one of its aims was redressing the shortcomings of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact." DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 80.
153 See COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 112, and sources cited ("[T]he scope of
the fundamental notion of 'force' is not undisputed. The term does not cover
any possible kind of force, but is, according to the correct and prevailing view,
limited to armed force."); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 81 ("[S]tudied in
context, the term 'force' in Article 2(4) must denote armed force."); Bert V.A.
R6ing, The Ban on the Use of Force and the U.N. Charter, in THE CURRENT LEGAL
REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 1, 1 (A. Cassese ed., 1986) ("There are many
differences of opinion... [but] it seems obvious to the present writer that the
'force' referred to in Art. 2(4) is military force."); cf. BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at
361-62 ("There can be little doubt that 'use of force' is commonly understood to
imply ... an 'armed attack,' by the organized military, naval, or air forces of a
state; ... [or] a government act[ing] through 'militia,' 'security forces,' or 'police
forces'. . . [or] by means of... 'unofficial' agents, including armed bands, and
'volunteers,' or... groups of insurgents on the territory of another state....
[Nevertheless] it is correct to assume that paragraph 4 applies to force other than
armed force, [albeit] it is very doubtful if it applies to economic measures of a
coercive nature." (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)).
154 See AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 31 and sources cited therein; see also
DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 81 ("The use of force in international relations, pro-
scribed in the Article, includes war. But the prohibition transcends war and cov-
ers also forcible measures short of war.").
155 See COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 117-118; see also DINSTEIN, supra note
131, at 86. The Charter contains two additional exceptions to its prohibition of
the use of force that have been overcome by events since 1945, and are thus no
longer significant. First is the exception under Article 53 for measures against
"enemy states" of the Second World War pursuant to Article 107 or regional ar-
rangements directed against the renewal of aggressive policy by such states. Since
all former "enemy states" are today U.N. members and are, thus, characterized as
peace-loving per Article 4 of the Charter, this exception is obsolete. Second is
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The exception to the general prohibition of the use of force
for Security Council enforcement actions has roots in three sep-
arate provisions, which are part of the Charter's system of collec-
tive sanctions.'56 First, Article 24 gives the Security Council
primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security. Second, Article 39 grants the Security Council the cor-
responding power to "determine the existence of any threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," and decide
what measures shall be taken "to maintain or restore power in-
ternational peace and security." Finally, Article 42 provides that
in certain cases, such "measures" may include the use of force.' 57
However, Security Council decisions under Article 39 are sub-
ject to the veto of any one of the five permanent members,'5 8
and, in practice, achieving unanimity among the permanent
members on such issues has proven nearly impossible; conse-
quently, this exception has rarely been invoked.'
the exception under Article 106, which allows the five permanent members of
the Security Council to take joint military action on behalf of the U.N.
"[p]ending the coming into force of such special arrangements referred to in
Article 43." To date, no Article 43 agreements have been concluded, but contem-
porary conditions make any action under Article 106 highly unlikely, so this ex-
ception likewise has no practical significance. See COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at
119; AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 30-33.
156 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, arts. 29-51; For a detailed discussion of the
U.N. system for collective conciliation and peace enforcement, see STONE, supra
note 112, at 185-200.
157 Forcible measures under this exception may be carried out by U.N. forces,
or by those of some or all of its members. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, arts.
25, 42, and 48.
158 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 27, 3.
159 Prior to 1990, the only example of the Security Council authorizing the use
of force was in 1966, when the Council decided that the situation in Rhodesia
constituted a threat to peace, and authorized the government of the United
Kingdom to use force to prevent ships carrying oil for Rhodesia (in violation of
an embargo) from accessing ports in Mozambique. COMMENTARY, supra note 131,
at 120, citing S.C. Res. 221 (Apr. 9, 1966), reprinted in 60 Am. J. INT'L. L. 925
(1966) (Resolution 221 was adopted by a 10 to 0 vote, with 5 abstentions: Bulga-
ria, France, Mali, U.S.S.R., and Uruguay). In 1990, the Council adopted Resolu-
tion 665, authorizing member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait
"to use such measures... as may be necessary... to ensure strict implementation"
of the U.N. embargo of Iraq, which the Council had ordered in response to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (SC Res. 665 (Aug. 25, 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329,
1330 (1990) (adopted by a 13 to 0 vote of the Security Council, with Cuba and
Yemen abstaining))-" [t] his resolution was understood to authorize states to use
naval force to halt the shipping in question." Oscar Schachter, United Nations
Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 Am.J. INT'L. L. 452, 454 (1991) [hereinafter Gulf Con-
flict]; compare S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990)
(adopted by a vote of 12-2-1, with Cuba and Yemen opposed and China ab-
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The second and more significant exception to the Charter's
prohibition of the use of force is the right of individual and col-
lective self-defense embodied in Article 51, which states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken the measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.""
Notably, the language of Article 51 (safeguarding the right of
self-defense "if an armed attack occurs") does not coincide with
the language of Article 2(4) (prohibiting "the threat or use of
force"). So to the extent that the notion of "armed attack" is
viewed as having a narrower meaning than the phrase "use or
threat of force,"'' Article 51 may be strictly read as not merely
barring States from resorting to self-defense to respond to mere
threats of force, but as also forbidding States from exerting for-
cible self-defense in response to any other unlawful force di-
rected against it by another State short of an actual armed
attack. 6 2 Under this interpretation, also known as the "restric-
staining) (authorizing member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait
"to use all necessary means... to restore international peace and security in the
area," if Iraq did not unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kuwait on or
before Jan. 15, 1991); Gulf Conflict, at 459 ("Resolution 678 was treated as the
legal basis of the large-scale military action... that brought about the defeat of
Iraq... and its withdrawal from Kuwait... [but] [t]he precise Charter basis of
Resolution 678 was somewhat uncertain. The Resolution itself declared that the
Council was acting under chapter VII, but it did not specify which article of chap-
ter VII."); see 1so STONE, supra note 112, at 303 (noting that concurrence of the
permanent members of the Security Council necessary for decisions under Arti-
cle 39 is rarely achieved).
160 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 51.
61 See COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 669, 663 n.l ("This represents the
dominant view."); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 365 ("It is not to be as-
sumed... that every unlawful use of force will involve an armed attack in the
tactical or military sense of the phrase."); but compare supra note 153 and accom-
panying text.
162 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, at 103,
195 (June 27, 1986) (the court suggests that "a mere frontier incident," like the
incursion of an armed patrol into another state's territory, would not be classified
as an armed attack) [hereinafter Nicaragua v. U.S.]; see aLso COMMENTARY, supra
note 131, at 663-64, 669; and DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 167 ("Recourse to self
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tionist" view, Article 51 of the Charter requires States to re-
nounce forcible self-defense unless and until an armed attack
actually occurs. 163
However, the notion that Article 51 permits forcible self-de-
fense only in cases of armed attack is highly contentious, particu-
larly inasmuch as it prohibits "anticipatory self-defense." For
according to customary international law prior to the Charter, a
State could lawfully take action to defend itself in anticipation of
an imminent attack, provided two conditions were met: first,
such forceful action had to be necessar--in other words, attack
was imminent and there were no peaceful means to prevent it;
and second, the force employed had to be proportionate to the
threat.'64 But under the restrictionist interpretation, Article 51
"supercedes and replaces the traditional right of self-defense"1 "5
and, in effect, abolishes the State's customary right to take antic-
ipatory defensive action.16"
Yet the drafting history of the Charter lends strong support to
the position that "the use of arms in legitimate self-defense [as it
existed prior to the Charter] remains admitted and unimpaired"
by Article 51.167 What's more, State practice in the period since
the Charter was adopted is clearly odds with the restrictionists'
defense under the article is not vindicated by any violation of international law
short of an armed attack."); contra C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of
Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 RECUEIL DES COURs 451, 496-97
(1952) ("It would be a misreading of the whole intention of Article 51 to inter-
pret it by mere implication as forbidding self-defense in resistance to an illegal
use of force not constituting an 'armed attack."').
163 AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 73; see also TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK,
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 138-139 (St. Martin's Press 1996).
164 See D.W. BowErT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 188-89 (Manchester
Univ. Press 1958) ("[T]he right [of self-defense] has, under traditional interna-
tional law, always been 'anticipatory,' that is to say its exercise was valid against
imminent as well as actual attacks and dangers."); AREND & BECK, supra note 89,
at 72.
165 COMMENTrxRY, supra note 131, at 678; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at
275; cf. Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 102-04, 193-95 (the court recog-
nized the existence of a right of self defense under customary law, but deemed
the content and scope of this right to correspond almost completely to the right
of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter); DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 87
("The liberty to venture into war, and generally to employ inter-State force, is
obsolete. Nowadays, the prohibition on the use of inter-State force, as articulated
in Article 2(4) of the Charter, has become an integral part of customary interna-
tional law.").
1;fi See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 278; AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 73.
167 See BOWETr, supra note 164, at 182 (quoting Report of the Rapporteur of
Committee I to Commission I, in 6 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION 459 (Jun. 13, 1945)); see also Oscar Schachter, The Right of
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narrow reading of its provisions.168 In fact, in recent debates in
the Security Council on this issue, delegates have referred to the
1842 formulation of the right of anticipatory self-defense by U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster, which requires a showing that
"[the] necessity of self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation,"
as an accepted statement of customary law. 16 9 There is thus
clear evidence of "the continued validity of an 'inherent' right
to use armed force in self-defense prior to an actual attack...
where such attack is imminent 'leaving no moment for delibera-
tion.""" ' The view of the United States and others that the
Charter reserves the customary right of self-defense-"this right
being considerably broader than that stated in Article 51"' 7 1 -to
include the right of anticipatory self-defense, is therefore quite
well founded. 1 72
States to Use Armed Force, 82 Micii. L. REX. 1620, 1633-34 (1984) [hereinafter Use of
Force].
168 See COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 678 ("[S]tate practice...has so far pre-
vented a narrow reading of... Article 51 from becoming established in customary
international law."); AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 72-79.
169 U.N. SCOR, 36th Sess., 2285-88th mtg., U.N. Docs. S/PV2285-88 (1981),
cited in Schachter, Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1635; see generally AREND & BECK,
supra note 89, at 77-79.
170 Schachter, Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1635 (emphasis added); see also
COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 678; cf. AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 79
("[T] hough there may not be an established consensus in support of the permis-
sibility of anticipatory self-defense... it would seem impossible to prove the exis-
tence of an authoritative and controlling norm prohibiting the use of force for
preemptive self-defense.").
171 BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 272, 269-75 (discussing the relationship be-
tween Art. 51 and the customary right of self-defense), 298-301 (on the customary
right of intervention and the U.N. Charter); see also COMMENTARY, supra note 131,
at 666-667; DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 172-76.
172 See Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Comment, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine
and Self-Defense, 57 Am.J. INT'L L. 597, 600 (1963) ("[N]othing in the 'plain and
natural meaning' of the words of the Charter requires an interpretation that Arti-
cle 51 restricts the customary right of self-defense. The proponents of such an
interpretation substitute for the words 'if an armed attack occurs' the very differ-
ent words 'if, and only if, an armed attack occurs."'); STONE, supra note 112, at
243-45 ("The form of Article 51 as a reservation rather than grant is critical.
Within the limits of Article 51 the license of self-defense is reserved... Beyond
these limits self-defense by all States still depends on customary international
law."); see also Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 347-48, 173 (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not agree with a construction of the United Nations Charter
which would read Article 51 as if it were worded. . . 'if, and only if, an armed
attack occurs...' I do not agree that the terms or intent of Article 51 eliminate
the right of self-defense under customary international law, or confine its entire
scope to the express terms of Article 51."); Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1634
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In addition to the controversy that exists over the conditions
precedent to the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense,
there is also disagreement among legal scholars concerning
what "measures," when taken by the Security Council, preempt
the right of self-defense. Arguably, the main object of the
United Nations Charter is to "render the unilateral use of force,
even in self-defense, subject to control by the Organization."' 73
To be sure, Article 51 expressly makes self-defense claims sub-
ject to the Security Council's authority, reserving the right of
States to act in self-defense only "until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security"1 74 Accordingly, the Council may, at least in theory,
order a claimant to cease military action even if the action was
legitimate self-defense. 75 The next logical question then, is
whether the right of individual or collective self-defense ceases if
the measures taken by the Council fall short of a resolution ter-
minating or suspending the right of self-defense; for instance, if
the Council fails to give its retrospective seal of approval to the
exercise of self-defense. 176
Reason dictates that the foregoing question must be answered
in the negative, for as Oscar Schachter so well articulated:
It does not make sense to conclude that failure of the Council to
endorse action by a state should bar that action when it is other-
wise permitted by the Charter and international law. A veto can
obviously prevent a Council decision and therefore block the
Council from prohibiting action. But a veto of a resolution that
("[I] t is not clear that Article 51 was intended to eliminate the customary right of
self-defense and it should not be given that effect."); BowETr, supra note 164, at
185-92, questioned in DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 174; and BROWNLIE, supra note
87, at 269; contra Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-42 (2nd ed. 1979)
(concerning the argument given in support of anticipatory defense: " [T] he argu-
ment is unfounded, its reasoning is fallacious, its doctrine pernicious.").
17- BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 273.
174 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, at art. 51 (emphasis added).
175 See Schachter, Gulf Conflict, supra note 159, at 459 ("[A] decision of that
character would need the unanimous concurrence of the permanent members;
hence, it could not be adopted over the objection of one or more of those mem-
bers"); cf. DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 188 ("Once a Member State is instructed in
a conclusive manner to refrain from any further use of force, it must comply with
the Council's directive." (emphasis added)).
176 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The
U.N. 's Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 478 (1991) (sug-
gesting that if a proposed resolution authorizing force such as Resolution 678-
the legal basis of military action against Iraq in 1991-had been vetoed, collective
self-defense action would have been barred).
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would approve or authorize otherwise permissible action cannot
have the legal effect of precluding that action. 177
Of course, the same must also hold true for all other "neces-
sary measures" adopted by the Security Council in response to
an armed attack on a State that do not conclusively terminate or
suspend self-defensive measures.17 Otherwise, a Security Coun-
cil decision ordering the invader to withdraw and cease hostili-
ties (a necessary measure) would strip the victim of its right to
defend itself even where the order is not complied with. As
Schachter correctly points out, "[t]his would be an implausi-
ble-indeed, absurd-interpretation." 179
All in all, mankind's efforts to "chain the dog of war"'" have
spanned the course of recorded time, but it was only with the
adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, that the transformation of
the "jus ad bellum" into the "jus contra bellum" was achieved. 131
Under Article 2(4), States renounce the right to use force in
their mutual relations-the "use of force becomes a delict," ex-
actly as it is under national law.'1 2 Chapter VII of the Charter
vests exclusive authority over the use of force in the U.N. organi-
zation, including the power, under Article 42, to use collective
force in response to this delict, though the Charter's promise of
"collective security" has yet to be fully realized in practice.,"
However, "Article 51 of the Charter clearly licenses at least one
kind of resort to force by an individual member State: namely,
177 Schachter, Gulf Conflict, supra note 159, at 459 n.23.
178 "A reasonable construction of the provision in Article 51 would recognize
that the Council has the authority to adopt a measure that would require armed
action to cease even if that action was undertaken in self-defense. However, this
would not mean that any meastre would preempt self-defense." Schachter, Gulf
Conflict, supra note 159, at 458 (emphasis added); see also DINSTEIN, supra note
131, at 189 ("[I]t is clearly not enough (tinder Article 51) for the Security Coun-
cil to adopt just any resolution, in order to divest Member States of the right to
continue to resort to force in self-defense against armed attack. The only resolu-
tion that will engender that result is a legally binding decision, whereby the cessa-
tion of the (real or imagined) defensive action becomes imperative."); but see
COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 676-77.
179 Schachter, Gulf Conflict, supra note 159, at 458.
181 Adapted from FRANCIS D. WORMUTH1 & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE
DoG OF WAR (2d ed., Univ. of Illinois Press 1989).
18, Michael E. Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can War Be Controlled?, in RE-
STRAINTS ON WAR: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 1, 11 (Michael
E. Howard ed., 1979).
182 jean Combacau, The Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT
LEGAL RECuLATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 9, 9 (A. Cassese ed., 1986).
Is:' See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 51.; see alsoAREND & BECK, supra note
89, at 73.
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the use of armed force to repel an attack."'' 1 4 Accordingly, the
lawfulness of the use of conventional force in response to cyber-
attack hinges, in part, on whether cyber-attack constitutes use of
force in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter or, more pre-
cisely, an "armed-attack," as a matter of law.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE AND CYBER-ATTACK
A. APPLICATION OF SELF-DEFENSE IN OUTER SPACE AND THE
MEANING OF "PEACEFUL PURPOSES"
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, sometimes referred to as "the
constitution of outer space," represents "the primary basis for
legal order in the space environment. 18 5 It provides in Article
III that:
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the explora-
tion and use of outer space, including the moon and other celes-
tial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining in-
ternational peace and security and promoting international co-
operation and understanding. 1
86
While it is universally agreed that the foregoing provision
makes the general principles of international law (lex gener-
alis)-including rules of customary law-and the United Na-
tions Charter applicable to outer space, 8 7 it is not universally
accepted that this includes the right to use force in self-de-
fense. 88 Having said this, however, the dominant view is that
the application of international law in outer space, in effect,
means that States may exercise their right of self-defense against
activities of other States. 8 ' The United States has supported
184 Bert V.A. R61ing, supra note 153, at 3.
185 CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 20
(Pergamon Press 1982).
186 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. III.
187 See Ivan A. Vlasic, Space Law and the Military Applications of Space Technology,
in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 385, 394 (N. jasentuliyana ed., 1995)
[hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON INT'LL.]; BESS C.M. RE[INEN, THE UNITED NATIONS
SPACE TREATIES ANALYZED 102 (Editions Fronti4res 1992).
188 See Vlasic in PERSPECTIVES ON INT'L L., supra note 187, at 394; HURWITZ,
supra note 25, at 71 (citing M. Chandrasekharan, Editorial Comment, The Space
Treaty, 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 61, 63 (1967)).
189 "Under present treaty rules and/or customary law, as demonstrated in prac-
tice, national statements, and United Nations resolutions... [i]nternational law,
including the United Nations Charter where appropriate, applies to acts in outer
space. This expressly includes the right of self defence." S. HOUSTON LAY &
HOWARD J. TAUBENFELD, THE LAw RELATING ro ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE 73
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this view since the inception of the Outer Space Treaty,".. and it
remains part of current U.S. space policy.' 9'
Precisely what measures States may take to defend their satel-
lites consistent with the "corpusjuris spatialis" is subject to contro-
versy since, in so far as they entail projection of force in, through,
or from space, they give rise to questions about the meaning and
scope of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty.1 1 2 Article IV
states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The estab-
lishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the test-
ing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military
maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of mil-
itary personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful
purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or
(1970); see also HURWITZ, supra note 25, at 72 (the Legal Sub-Committee of the
U.N. Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has rejected
the view that the right of self-defense is not applicable in regards to outer space);
GENNADII ZHUKOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 89 (Progress Publishers 1976)
(states can lawfully use force in or through outer space in the process of self-
defense); J.E.S. FAWCETF, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF OUTER SPACE 39
(Manchester Univ. Press 1968) (No provision of the Charter or rule of customary
law imposes "any tipper limit above the surface of the Earth on the legitimate
exercise of the right of self-defense.").
0" CHRISTOL, su)ra note 185, at 37.
'9' See National Space Policy (1996), supra note 14 ("National security space
activities shall contribute to U.S. national security by... providing support for the
United States' inherent right of self-defense... The United States considers the
space systems of any nation to be national property with the right of passage
through and operations in space without interference. Purposeful interference
with space systems shall be viewed as an infringement on sovereign rights."); see
also supra pp. 22 (quoting DoDD 3100.10, supra note 4, at 6, 4.1-4.2); SPACE
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 37 ("It is important to note.., that by specifi-
cally extending the principles of the U.N. Charter to space, the Outer Space
Treaty (Article III) provides for the right of individual and collective self-defense,
including "anticipatory self-defense.").
192 See HURwrrz, supra note 25, at 75; D. Goedhuis, Legal Implications of the
Present and Projected Military Uses of Outer Space, in MAINTAINING OUTER SPACE
FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES 253, 260-64 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1984) (Pro-
ceedings of a Symposium held in The Hague, Mar. 1984) [hereinafter PEACEFUL
PURPOSES].
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facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the moon and other
celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited." 3
While the adjective "peaceful" can be found in virtually all
U.N. documents relating to outer space, the treaties that make
up international space law fail to provide an authoritative defini-
tion of the term.'94 The phrase "peaceful purposes" as used in
the Outer Space Treaty was originally adapted from the 1959
Antarctic Treaty, 95 which, to a considerable extent, served as
the model for the 1967 treaty." 6 Article I of the Antarctic
Treaty reads as follows:
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There
shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military na-
ture, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifica-
tions, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the
testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military per-
sonnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purpose.
Because the Antarctic Treaty is credited with the "demilitari-
zation" of the Antarctic, '97 it is often cited as the most authorita-
tive aid for the interpretation of the term "peaceful" in the outer
space context,"' particularly by those who seek to equate
"peaceful," as it pertains to outer space, with "non-military."'' 9
However, in view of the fact that the Outer Space Treaty permits
certain military activities in those areas reserved "exclusively for
peaceful purposes" (i.e., the moon and other celestial bod-
193 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. IV (emphasis added).
194 Ivan A. Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE 37, 37 (B. Jasani ed., 1991) [here-
inafter PEACEFUL. USES OF SPACE]; see also BhupendraJasani, Introduction in PEACE-
FUL USES OF SPACE at 7.
195 Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 72, 1959 U.S.T.
LEXIS 420 (ratified by the United States on Aug. 18, 1960; entered into force on
Jun. 23. 1961).
196 REIJNEN, supra note 187, at 88.
19v See PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 41 n.12; see also Aldo A.
Cocca, Historical Precedents for Demilitarization, in PEACEFUL PURPOSES, supra note
192, at 29, 41-42.
198 PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 41.
199 See BIN Ci -ENG, The Commercial Development of Space: the Need for New Treaties
(Adapted from a keynote address delivered at a seminar on The Cape York Space
Port: The Legal and Business Issues, Aug. 17, 1990), 19 J. SPACE L. 17 (1991),
reprinted in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAw 641, 651 (Clarendon Press
1997) [hereinafter STUDIES IN SPACE LAW].
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ies), and, at the same time, makes international law (includ-
ing the right of self-defense) applicable to those same
extraterrestrial regions, 2°1 it is doubtful that the drafters of the
treaty intended to attach such a definition to the term "peace-
ful. ' 2°2 Furthermore, the practice of States, at the time of the
treaty's adoption and since, plainly belies such an
interpretation .20 3
For its part, the United States has, from the very beginning of
the space age up to the present day, maintained the official posi-
tion that "peaceful" means "non-aggressive" and not "non-mili-
tary. ' 214 Indeed, while some of the very earliest U.S. statements
on the international control of space activities appear to support
the proposition that outer space should be used exclusively for
200 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. IV, 2 ("The use of military person-
nel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited.").
2 1 Id. art. III; see also sources cited in note 188.
202 See jasentuliyana, The Moon Treaty, in PEACEFUL PURPOSES, supra note 192, at
121, 128; Stephen Gorove, Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and Some Alterna-
tives for Further Arms Control, in PEACEFUL PURPOSES, supra note 192, at 77, 82 (as-
serting that the drafters intended to give "peaceful" a distinct meaning within the
context of the treaty itself); compare CHENG, supra note 199, in STUDIES IN SPACE
LAW, supra note 199, at 650 (arguing that Article I of the Antarctic Treaty, in
which the word "peaceful" is used in contradistinction to "military," was "very
much in the minds of those who drew up the 1967 Space Treaty"). The argu-
ment that the Outer Space Treaty prohibits all military activities on the Moon
and other celestial bodies, except those expressly permitted by the treaty is sup-
ported by the fact that at the time the treaty was adopted, military activities were
not being carried out in these areas. See MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 106-08 (Sijthoff Leiden
1972).
203 See PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 42, 45. Vlasic notes that by
the time negotiations on the Outer Space Treaty (OST) began, the United States
and Soviet Union were both "using outer space for a variety of military purposes"
(e.g., surveillance, communications, navigation, etc.), which the United States
openly regarded as "peaceful." While the Soviet Union publicly opposed these
activities, it secretly engaged in them as well, and thus acquiesced to the U.S.
interpretation. Thus, Vlasic states: "[W]ith only the Soviet Union and the United
States active in outer space before and for sometime after the entry into force of
the OST, the 'practice' of even one space power, clearly a 'specially affected'
state, carried substantial weight in law. All the more so when supported by sev-
eral other states with developing space capabilities."
204 BIN CHENG, Definitional Issues in Space Law: the "Peaceful Use" of Outer
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (Adapted from the paper
The Legal Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and
Definitions of Peaceful Use, 11J. SPACE L. 89 (1983)), in STUDIES IN SPACE LAw, supra
note 199, at 513, 515; see also Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial Com-
munication Satellites: A Newo Look at the Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes, "60
J. AIR L. & Com. 237, 303, 304 n.353-55.
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nonmilitary purposes,2 °5 by the spring of 1958 (less than a year
after the launch of Sputnik I), the anticipation of the availability
of reconnaissance satellites triggered a decisive shift in U.S. pol-
icy towards the view that space could and should be used for
"peaceful," rather than "nonmilitary" purposes.26 Thus, the
1958 Space Act (the statutory basis for the national space pro-
gram) 2°17 requires that U.S. space activities be devoted to "peace-
ful purposes," while also mandating that these activities
contribute to "national defense. '"208
Once again, a main goal of U.S. space policy during the pre-
outer space treaty era (1957-1967) was to gain international rec-
ognition of the legality of reconnaissance satellites, while simul-
taneously discouraging military space activities that threatened
those assets. 2 9 So it is hardly surprising that the U.S. interpreta-
tion of "peaceful" as synonymous with "non-aggressive" reflects
and upholds that policy. The definition is a corollary to the
meaning of the terms "peace" and "aggression" found in the
U.N. Charter. 21° "Essentially, nations have agreed in the Char-
ter to act 'peacefully,' a term which the Charter then elaborates
with specific examples, e.g., suppression of acts of aggression, no
threats or use of force, save in the common interest or for (legit-
imate) self-defense. '211 By the same token, "It] he term 'peaceful
purposes'. . . was interpreted by the United States to mean...
[that] all military uses are permitted and lawful as long as they
205 E.g., National Security Council Action No. 1553 (Nov. 21, 1956) (outlining
a U.S. disarmament proposal to prohibit "the production of objects designed for
travel in or projection though outer space for military purposes," which would
have ultimately banned ICBMs as well as military satellites), quoted in STARES,
supra note 6, at 54 ("It is difficult to assess how sincere Eisenhower and his admin-
istration were with these proposals."); see aLso PERSPECTIVES ON INT'L L., supra note
188, at 39.
206 See NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, PRELIMINARY U.S. POLICY IN OUTER SPACE
(NSC 5814/1) (Jun. 20, 1958), reprinted in ORGANIZING FOR EXPLORATION, supra
note 7; quoted in STARES, supra note 6, at 55; cf. PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra
note 194, at 40 ("[A]s early as 1958-59, the legal position of the United States
with respect to the meaning of the phrase "peaceful uses" became crystallized
along lines quite dissimilar from the initial rhetoric.").
207 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat.
426 (1958) (unamended) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451 et seq.
(2000)).
208 Id. §102.
209 See PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 195, at vi-ix, 6-7.
210 Morgan, supra note 204, at 305.
211 Id. at 305 n.357.
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remain 'non-aggressive' as per Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,
which prohibits 'the threat or use of force.' 21 2
In contrast, as part of a diplomatic offensive to ban U.S. re-
connaissance satellites,2t3 the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) initially
took the view that "peaceful purposes" indeed meant "non-mili-
tary," and that all military activities in space were thus prohib-
ited.2 '4 However, although the Soviets consistently maintained
that all of their activities in space were "peaceful" and "scien-
tific,"215 the U.S.S.R.'s official line eventually softened as its mili-
tary satellite programs came into their own, such that it can be
said that the Soviets, at least, acquiesced to the U.S. interpreta-
tion. 2 6 And, as Professor Vlasic notes:
[w]ith only the Soviet Union and the United States active in
outer space before and for sometime after entry into force of the
Outer Space Treaty, the 'practice' of even one space power,
clearly a 'specially affected' state carried substantial weight in
law. All the more so when supported by several other states with
developing space capabilities.217
212 PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 40; see also Paul G. Dembling &
Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33J. Air L. & Com. 419,
434 (1967). Commenting on the prospect of future efforts to address the non-
incorporation of outer space into the Outer Space Treaty provision in Article
IV(2), which confines all activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies to
solely "peaceful purposes," Dembling, then General Counsel of NASA, writes: "In
the interim, one might conclude that any military use of outer space must be
restricted to nonaggressive purposes in view of Article III, which makes applicable
international law including the Charter of the United Nations" (emphasis ad-
ded). But compare CHENG, supra note 199, in STUDIES IN SPACE LAw, supra note
199, at 651-52 (proposing that the U.S. interpretation of "peaceful" as meaning
"non-aggressive" is due to "an initial misreading of the Treaty and the erroneous
belief that the restriction of the use for 'exclusively peaceful purposes'. . . extends
to the whole of outer space.").
213 See STARES, supra note 6, at 69.
214 PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 40. "For more than twenty years
scholars of international law in the Soviet Union have unanimously stated that
'use for peaceful purposes' should be interpreted as 'nonmilitary use."' PERSPEC-
TIVES ON INT'L L., supra note 188, at 40 n.il.
215 See Morgan, supra note 204, at 304; see also CHENG, supra note 199, in STUD-
IES IN SPACE LAw, supra note 199, at 650.
21h See STARES, supra note 6, at 71 ("Soviet diplomatic opposition to US satellite
reconnaissance effectively ceased in September 1963."); see also PEACEFUL USES OF
SPACE, supra note 194, at 42; Morgan, supra note 204, at 304.
217 PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 45 n.16 (noting that "[a] rule
becomes a rule of customary international law when a significant majority of
states, including those states whose interests are specifically affected, act in accor-
dance with that rule because the believe it to be binding. . . [and] state prac-
tice. . . [is] both extensive and virtually uniform." (citing The North Sea
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In sum, while it can perhaps still be said that there are two
competing definitions of "peaceful purposes" (one being "non-
military" and the other "non-aggressive"), 218 no State has ever
formally protested the U.S. version of "peaceful" in the context
of outer space activities.219 Hence, within the United Nations a
consensus has developed that "peaceful," as employed in the
Outer Space Treaty, more specifically equates to "non-aggres-
sive."220 In practice, this has led to an understanding among the
major space actors that all military activities in outer space are
permissible, unless specifically prohibited by treaty or customary
international law. 2
So, in a nutshell, application of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Char-
ter in outer space makes it unlawful for any State to interfere in
a hostile manner with the space assets of another State,222 and
while Article TV of the Outer Space Treaty prohibits States from
stationing weapons of mass destruction or nuclear weapons in
outer space, or engaging in aggressive military activities on the
Moon or celestial bodies, it does not, in any way, invalidate the
inherent right of national self-defense pursuant to customary
law and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 223 Additionally, the
Outer Space Treaty makes clear the fact that the State on whose
national registry a satellite is carried retains 'jurisdiction" over
the satellite in space.22 4 Therefore, inasmuch as 'jurisdiction"
may be viewed as equivalent to "sovereignty" in this context,225
"[t] he right of a State to defend objects under its sovereignty on
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. And Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46, para. 73 (Feb.
20)).
218 This debate "has not been resolved and may never be." Morgan, supra note
204, at 241; see also CHENG, supra note 199, in STUDIES IN SPACE LAW, supra note
199, at 650-52.
219 PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 45.
220 Morgan, supra note 204, at 303 (quoting Walter D. Reed & Robert W. Nor-
ris, Military Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L. REV. 665, 678 (1979)).
221 PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE, supra note 194, at 38, 45.
222 See PERSPECTVES ON INT'L L., supra note 187, at 394; Philip D. O'Neill, Jr.,
The Development of International Law Governing the Military Use of Outer Space, in
NATIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 169, 177; see also Manfred Lachs, Preserv-
ing the Space Environment (Opening Address to the Symposium on the Condi-
tions Essential for Maintaining Outer Space for Peaceful Uses, Mar. 12, 1984), in
PEACEFUL PURPOSES, supra note 192, at 5, 7.
223 See CHRISTOL, supra note 185, at 37; sources cited supra note 189.
224 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. VIII.
225 "'Jurisdiction' is not synonymous with 'sovereignty,' since the latter is per-
manent while the former may change as, for example, in the case of a ship in a
foreign port. However, in the unique case of outer space, where there are no
'foreign ports,' the difference between 'jurisdiction' and 'sovereignty' may, at
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earth logically extends to outer space. ''22 1 In this way, the right
of self-defense in space can be viewed as analogous to protection
of vessels on the high seas, 221 which Professor Brownlie aptly de-
scribes as follows:
[V]essels on the open sea may use force proportionate to the
threat offered to repel attack by other vessels, or by aircraft. This
right must rest on general principles whether the analogy of ves-
sel and state territory is accepted or not... Nor can there be any
doubt that the armed forces of the flag state may use reasonable force to
defend vessels from attack whether by pirates or forces acting with or
without the authority of any state.228
And so, just as the right of the State to forcefully defend ves-
sels attacked on the high seas extends to all vessels registered in
the State (i.e., without regard to whether the vessel that is the
target of the attack is a State or private instrumentality), so too
must the State's right to defend satellites in space apply equally
to all satellites carried on its national registry, including com-
mercial satellites. 229
From the foregoing discussion, one can reasonably conclude
that-pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, which is af-
firmed under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter-the "flag state," or
least as regards the right of self-defense, be insignificant." HURWITZ, supra note
25, at 74 n.84.
226 Id. at 74 (quoting DELBERT D. SMrrii, SPACE STATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND POLICY 105 (Westview Press 1979)); see also O'Neill, supra note 222, in NA-
TIONAL INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 177; LAY & TAUBENFELD, supra note 189, at 72-
73 ("The right of self-defense is common to all systems of law... It is certainly no
surprise that nations feel obliged to look to their own defenses with respect to
outer space activities by others.").
227 See BIN CHENG, International Law and High Altitude Flights: Balloons, Rockets,
and Man-made Satellites, 6 INST. COMP. L.Q. 487 (1957), reprinted in STUDIES IN
SPACE LAW, supra note 199, at 14, 20-21; and HURWITZ, supra note 25, at 73
("[T]he authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive...
but its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the
limits of its territory.") (quoting Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187 (1804), quoted in
Howard J. Taubenfeld, A Regime for Outer Space, 56 Nw. U. L. REV. 129, 142
(1962)); MYERS S. McDOUGAL, ET AL., LAW AND THE PUBLIC ORDER IN OUTER
SPACE 525 (Yale Univ. Press 1963); JOHN COBB COOPER, Fundamental Questions of
Outer Space Law (Address Delivered at the University of Leiden, Oct. 10, 1960), in
ExPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW 286, 295-96 (Ivan A. Vlasic ed., 1968) [hereinaf-
ter AEROSPACE LAW]; and LAy & TAUBENFELD, supra note 189, at 73 (citing C.
Ward, Projecting the Law of the Sea Into the Law of Outer Space, JAG J. (Navy) 4
(March 1957)).
228 BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 305 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).
229 See DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 186 (the use of force by a State against a
private vessel or aircraft registered in another State but attacked beyond the na-
tional boundaries qualifies as an armed attack against the State of registry).
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more appropriately in the case of satellites, the "State of regis-
try, ''231 may use armed force to defend those satellites carried on
its national registry (including commercial satellites) against at-
tack by another State.23' However, since the right of self-defense
can only be exercised against an armed attack or its imminent
threat, the question remains whether "cyber-attack" constitutes
an "armed attack."
B. CYBER-ATITACK AS AN "ARMED ATrACK"
Once again, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
the inherent right of self-defense is expressly linked to an armed
attack. 32 Yet, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted
in the case of Nicaragua v. United States, "a definition of the
'armed attack' which, if found to exist, authorizes the exercise
of the 'inherent right' of self-defense, is not provided in the
Charter, and is not part of treaty law. '1211 Consequently, it is nec-
essary to look elsewhere to determine whether cyber-attack con-
stitutes an "armed attack" justifying self-defense within the
framework of Article 51.
The dictionary definition of "armed" is "furnished with weap-
ons" or "marked by the maintenance of armed [i.e., military]
forces," while "attack" means "to set upon or work against force-
fully," or "to affect or act on injuriously," or "to make an on-
slaught upon," or "an offensive [as opposed to defensive]
action," or "belligerent or antagonistic. ' 234 Armed attack thus
clearly implies the use of arms or military force and has an of-
fensive, destructive, and illegal nature. 23" But particularly signif-
icant in this regard is the "Definition of Aggression" adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly through Resolution 3314 (Article
1)-it provides:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
210 "A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried." Outer Space Treaty, supra note 21, art. IV; see also Registration
Convention, supra note 24, art. I(c).
231 HURWITZ, supra note 25, at 75; see also PERSPECTIVES ON INT'L L., supra note
187, at 394.
232 See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 51.
233 Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 94, 176.
234 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 63, 74 (10th ed. 1997).
235 See J.N. SINGH, USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (Harnam
Publ'ns 1984).
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State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 36
Article 3 of Resolution 3314 is likewise noteworthy-it enu-
merates specific acts that amount to acts of aggression "regard-
less of a declaration of war," which include:
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the ter-
ritory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State
against the territory of another State; [and]
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands,
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
Of course, the text of Resolution 3314 makes clear the fact
that it is intended to serve as a guide to the Security Council in
determining the existence of aggression under Article 39 and
not as a definition of "armed attack. '23 7 Nevertheless, if armed
attack is understood to be a type of aggression that justifies self-
defense under Article 51 of the Charter, i.e., "une agression
arme" (or "aggression which is armed"),238 then the resolution's
definition of aggression and the specific acts of aggression enu-
merated in Article 3 are at least illustrative of the types of cir-
cumstances wherein recourse to self-defense is vindicated. 3 9
That is, insofar as a cyber-attack on a State's commercial satel-
lites is (1) commensurate with the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty of another State241 (or perhaps, more
specifically, with the use of weapons by a State against the terri-
tory of another State); 24' (2) not justified as either self-defense
or collective security;242 and (3) not de minimus in scope or ef-
fect,24 " it can reasonably be inferred that it will constitute an
"armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51.
236 Definition of aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 480 (1975)
(Adopted without a vote at the 2319th plenary meeting, Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinaf-
ter Definition of Aggression].
237 Id. at Preamble, 2 and 4, & art. 6; see also COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at
668-69; DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 115.
238 DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 166.
239 Cf COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 668 (asserting that "aggression" as de-
fined in Resolution 3314 does not coincide with the notion of "armed attack"
under Article 51 of the Charter).
240 Definition of Aggression, supra note 236, art. 1.
241 Id. art. 3(b).
242 Id. art. 6.
243 Id. art. 2.
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On the key issue of whether cyber-attack is commensurate
with the use of armed force, Professor Brownlie's discussion of
the "use of weapons which do not involve any explosive effect"
merits special consideration.244 Brownlie proposes that weapons
(such as biological and chemical weapons), which do not em-
ploy the force of shock waves and heat associated with more or-
thodox weapons, may nevertheless be assimilated to the use of
force on two grounds: "In the first place the agencies concerned
are commonly referred to as 'weapons' and forms of 'war-
fare'. . . [and] the second consideration [is] the fact that these
weapons are employed for the destruction of life and prop-
erty.''24  By analogy, "cyber-attack" is similarly viewed as a
weapon246 in the arsenal of "Information Warfare. 247 What's
more, regardless of whether a satellite is struck by an ASAT
weapon (be it a nuclear burst, kinetic weapon or high-energy
particle beam) or a computer virus, the effect is the same-crip-
pling of the satellite and/or its function. Under Brownlie's for-
mulation then, cyber-attack on a satellite does indeed equate to
the use of armed force.
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that cyber-attack can be objec-
tively likened to "armed force," there is still no generally recog-
nized definition of what constitutes an "armed attack. 248
Consequently, whenever the justification of self-defense is
244 See BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 362.
245 Id.
246 SeeJOINT VISION 2020, supra note 32, at 29 (defining "Information Opera-
tions" as a "weapon"); see also NDP REPORT, supra note 31, at 90 (defining "Cyber
Assault" as "an attack through cyberspace").
247 See Robert G. Hanseman, The Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare, 42
A.F. L. REv. 173, 176 (1997) ("Cyberwar, Netwar, and others terms are used [to
describe use of Information Warfare]."); see also sources cited supra note 32.
248 COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 669 ("The Nicaragua judgment... has not
brought any clarification in this respect."); cf BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 366 ("A
requirement stated by some writers is that the use of force must attain a certain
gravity and that 'frontier incidents' are excluded."); and Nicaragua v. U.S., supra
note 162, at 103, 195 ("[t]here appears now to be general agreement on the
nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particu-
lar, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be understood
as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an international
border, but also, 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an actual armed attack con-
ducted by regular forces, 'or its substantial involvement therein.' This descrip-
tion, contained in. . . the Definition of Aggression annexed to Generally
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary interna-
tional law.").
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raised, the question becomes one of fact-i.e., are the measures
taken in self-defense necessary and proportionate in relation to the
apparent threat? "49 And, in general, the determination of
whether those conditions are met will, at least initially, be left to
the State resorting to self-defense. 25" That is not to say, however,
that any unilateral use of force can be declared to occur in re-
sponse to an armed attack and be de facto 'justified" as self-de-
fense pursuant to Article 51.25 1 For, once again, the U.N.
Security Council is empowered by the Charter to order termina-
tion of the self-defense measures, if it so decides. 252
C. USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCE IN RESPONSE
TO CYBER-ATTACK
Once it is established that the right of self-defense is legally
available, the challenge then becomes how to exercise self-de-
fense. It has been argued that a coordinated U.S. national de-
fense strategy for cyber-space must include effective deterrence,
which in turn may need to embrace the use of conventional
force in response to cyber-attack. 53 International law does not
dictate the particular type of action which has to be taken by a
state exercising its right of self-defense; however, the choice of
instrumentality, the degree with which it can be used, and the
consequences of such use, will all be influenced by the law gov-
erning the means and methods of war-jus in bello or 'law of
armed conflict.' 254 Though this article will not attempt an ex-
tensive discussion of the law of armed conflict,255 a brief discus-
sion of the basic legal requirements that must be complied with
while exercising self-defense is important to understanding
whether and to what extent conventional force may be used to
respond to cyber-attack on commercial satellite systems.
249 Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 103, 194 cited in Schachter, Gulf Con-
flict, supra note 159, at 458; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 87, at 366.
250 See Schachter, Gulf Conflict, supra note 159, at 458.
2'5 See COMMENTARY, supra note 131, at 669.
252 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 39 & 41; see also Schachter, Gulf Conflict,
supra note 159, at 458.
251 See Adams, supra note 37, at 108-10.
254 SINCH, supra note 230, at 21-22.
255 For detailed discussion of thejus in bello and its applicability to outer space,
see Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48
A.F. L. REV. 1 (2000), and sources cited therein.
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1. Necessity and Proportionality
As mentioned previously, a state exercising its right of self-
defense must comply with the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality. 25" "Necessity" means just that-forceful action is
necessary to defend against an attack.257 Though the requirement
of necessity is not controversial as a general proposition:
[I] ts application... calls for assessments of intentions and condi-
tions bearing upon the likelihood of attack [in the case of 'antici-
patory' self-defense] or, if an attack has already taken place, of
the likelihood that peaceful means may be effective to restore
peace and remove the attackers.258
In this way, "necessity" relates back to the view of armed force
"a means of last resort," whereby the resort to force is to be con-
sidered legally available only after recourse to peaceful means of
settlement have failed.25" Obviously, in the case where an attack
has already occurred, the State being attacked must be consid-
ered under conditions of necessity, regardless of the possibilities
for peaceful settlement, since to argue otherwise would, in ef-
fect, nullify the right of self-defense. 6 Ergo, as a rule, when an
attack occurs against a State, armed force may be used to repel
the attack without further justification, and notwithstanding the
State's obligation to seek peaceful settlement under Article 2(3)
of the U.N. Charter.26'
Closely linked to "necessity" as an element of self-defense is
the concept of 'proportionality.' 26 2 Proportionality reflects the
ultimate purpose of self-defense, which is not punishment or re-
prisal, but rather to repel or prevent an armed attack or its im-
256 See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 146, art. 51, see also, supra note 249; see also
Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1635-38; and SINGH-, supra note 230, at
22-23.
257 AREND & BECK, supra note 89, at 72.
258 Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1635; cf BROWNLIE, supra note
87, at 259 ("[Anticipatory self-defense] . .. involves [the] determination of the
certainty of attack which is extremely difficult to make and necessitates an at-
tempt to ascertain the intention of a government.").
259 See Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1635; see also supra p. 30-31
and sources cited.
260 Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1635.
261 Id. at 1636; see also supra p. 43 and note 150.
262 See Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1637; see also Judith Gail
Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 Am. J. INT'L L. 391, 403
(1993); D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 295, 305 (1994).
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minent threat;263 therefore, so as not to be deemed illegally
disproportionate, "[a]cts done in self defense must not exceed
in manner or aim the necessity provoking them. '264 This con-
struct is commonly demonstrated in governments' responses to
isolated frontier incursions or naval incidents-by and large,
"[t]he 'defending' state under attack generally limits itself to
force proportionate to the attack; it does not bomb cities or
launch an invasion. 265
Geography can likewise play a significant role in determining
proportionality. For example, "an isolated attack in one
place. . . would not normally warrant a defensive action deep
into the territory of the attacking state. 2 "'  However, the impor-
tance of geography to the proportionality of a defensive re-
sponse greatly depends upon the specific circumstances of the
situation occasioning the claim of self-defense; indeed, "a State
subjected to an armed attack is entitled to resort to self-defense
measures against the aggressor, regardless of the geographical
point where the attack was delivered. ' 2 7 Hence, "when a series
of attacks in one area leads to the conclusion that defense re-
quires a counterattack against the 'source' of the attack on a
scale that would deter future attacks," the attacked State can le-
gally respond "beyond the immediate area of the attack," espe-
cially if the attacked State has reason to expect attacks from that
source to continue.26 8 This is true even if the location of the
attack is "beyond the boundaries of all States," such as when
"[the aggressor State's] armed forces destroy a satellite put in
orbit in outer space by [the defending State] .-"69
215-1 SINGH, supra note 230, at 22.
264 Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1637; see also Gardam, supra note
262, at 405 ("The legitimacy of... [military] actions... is a question of degree,
with civilian casualties a particularly relevant factor in assessing
proportionality.").
265 Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1637; see also DINSTEIN, supra
note 131, at 176 ("[Ain armed attack-justifying self-defense as a response under
Article 51-need not take the shape of a massive military operation. "[Low inten-
sity" fighting, conducted on a relatively small scale, may also be deemed an
armed attack.]") (citing Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 103, 195).
266 Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1637-38.
267 DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 177.
268 Schachter in Use of Force, supra note 167, at 1638.
21-9 DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 177.
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2. The Rules of Warfare ([us In Bello)
In addition to satisfying the threshold requirements for exer-
cising the right of self-defense (necessity and proportionality),
States are also bound to observe the laws of warfare, which are
customary as well as conventional in nature. 27 11 The basic notion
underlying all such rules is that "the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. ' 12 7 1 From
this basic maxim are derived the principles of "proportionality
and discrimination. '"272 In this context, proportionality can
mean one of two things: (1) proportionality of a belligerent re-
sponse to a grievance, or (2) proportionality in relation to the
adversary's military actions or the anticipated military value of
one's own actions. 273 Discrimination, on the other hand, is
about care in the selection of methods, weaponry, and targets,
and includes the idea of the immunity of non-combatants. 274
In practice, military manuals on the laws of war generally em-
phasize three customary principles, which incorporate the over-
arching principles of "proportionality and discrimination": (1)
military necessity, (2) humanity, and (3) chivalry.275 These
three principles have been defined as follows:
1. Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited
by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or com-
plete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure
of time, life, and physical resources may be applied.
2. The employment of any kind or degree of force not required
for the purpose of the partial or complete submission of the
enemy with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical
resources is prohibited.
270 "[S]ome of the most important instruments which contain such laws" in-
clude: "[t]he Declaration of Paris, 1856, the Geneva Convention, 1864, the Decla-
ration of St. Petersburg, 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the
Geneva Gas and Bacteriological Warfare Protocol, 1925, and the four Geneva
Red Cross Conventions, 1949." SINGH, supra note 230, at 23; see also THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 105.
271 DocuMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 9 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds.,
2000).
272 Id. at 9-10.
279 Id. (Proportionality is "a link between jus ad bellum and jus in bello"); see also
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 270, at 79-82 and sources cited.
274 DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 271, at 9-10.
275 Id.
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3. Dishonorable (treacherous) means, dishonorable expedients,
and dishonorable conduct during armed conflict are
forbidden.2 76
This is obviously just a pr(cis of some basic principles of the
jus in bello. Indeed, the body of law governing the weapons and
methods of warfare is vast and includes not only customary in-
ternational law and multilateral treaties on the laws of war, but
also regional and bilateral agreements on the laws of war, vari-
ous arms control and disarmament agreements, general human
rights agreements, and unilateral declarations made by States, as
well as national laws and regulations relating to the laws of war.
Suffice it to say, these laws will be applicable to the State's defen-
sive action in varying degrees, depending once again on the cir-
cumstances of the situation, and therefore must be taken into
account when determining how to exercise self-defense.
3. Reporting to the Security Council
Apart from the practical restraints on the use of force in self-
defense imposed by the laws of war, Article 51 of the Charter
also prescribes the procedural requirement that "[m]easures
taken by members in the exercise of [the] right of self-defense
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council." What
significance the reporting obligation has to the State's right of
self-defense, if any, is not clear. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ
essentially held that because the customary right of self-defense
exists independent of the Charter, the failure to observe the re-
porting requirement did not breach any obligation governing
States' exercise of the right. 277 Yet, the Court simultaneously ob-
served that failure to observe the requirement was inconsistent
with a valid claim of self-defense.278 Suffice it to say, under the
terms of the U.N. Charter, non-performance of the reporting
obligation in no way prejudices a State's invocation of the right
of self-defense; to read it otherwise has been deemed a "gross
misinterpretation. ' 279 So, in the end, perhaps the most that can
be said about satisfying the Article 51 reporting requirement is
276 Id. (quoting U.S. DEPT. OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERA-
TIONS, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP-9,
at 5-1 (1987)).
277 Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 121, 235.
278 Id. at 121-22, 235.
27., DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 191.
1264
2002]CYBER-ATTACK ON COMMERCIAL SPACE SYSTEMS 1265
that it is but one of many factors bearing on the legitimacy of a
States' claim to self defense.28 °
V. CONCLUSION
The commercial use of outer space is growing rapidly, and on
a global scale. In 1996, the annual number of commercial space
launches surpassed the number of government launches for the
first time. In 1997, the National Defense Panel noted that more
than 1,000 satellites were expected to be launched in the decade
between 1997 and 2006, representing a total investment of more
than one-half trillion dollars.28 ' The ability of the United States'
military to operate in space is unquestionably seen as vital to the
nation's security. In fact, in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2000, the Congress asked the DoD to "identify the
technologies and technology demonstrations needed... to take
full advantage of use of space for national security purposes. 282
According to U.S. Space Command, this is likely to entail in-
creased military use of civil, commercial, and international
space systems.283
At the same time, the strength of American conventional
forces and the U.S. military's already extensive and growing use
of commercial space technology, makes the possibility of cyber-
attack on U.S commercial space systems ever more likely,284 and
protecting commercial space systems becomes more difficult as
they continue their global expansion. 2 5 Therefore, given the
importance of commercial space activity and its ever-growing ef-
fect on U.S. national security, it is in the interests of the United
States, and any other State similarly dependent on its space as-
sets, to establish an effective deterrence regime for cyber-
space.286
Current U.S. policy provides for deterring and, if necessary,
defending against purposeful interference with U.S. space sys-
tems using "all appropriate self-defense measures, including...
280 Id. ("[I] nstantaneous transmittal of a report is no guarantee that the Coun-
cil will accept that claim. Conversely, the failure to file a report at an early stage
should not prove an irremediable defect.").
2s, NDP REPORT, supra note 31, at 38.
282 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, P.L. No. 106-65,
§ 1601, 113 Stat. 512 (1999).
283 USSPACECOM 2020, supra note 4, at 7.
284 See Adams, supra note 37, at 99.
285 USSPACECOM 2020, supra note 4, at 10.
286 See Adams, supra note 37, passim.
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the use of force. 28 7 However, when it comes to deterring cyber-
attack against commercial space systems, the United States is ar-
guably in a position similar to the one it was in at the beginning
of the space age with regard to ASAT weapons. In other words,
the asymmetry between U.S. dependence upon space and that
of many potential adversaries is such that the U.S. may not be
able to deter interference with U.S. commercial satellites by
threat of reciprocal action.
The preceding analysis suggests that the "corpus juris spatialis"
and the law governing resort to force in self-defense under Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter allow for the measured and
proportional use of conventional force response to cyber-attack
on commercial satellites, provided such actions are carried out
in accordance with the applicable rules of war. Within the
bounds of international law, U.S. policy can therefore be under-
stood to authorize conventional force as a self-defensive mea-
sure in response to a cyber-attack on U.S. commercial space
systems. Such an approach enhances the credibility of the U.S.
policy of deterrence by neutralizing the asymmetrical advantage
an attacking State may enjoy by virtue of its lack of reliance on
space.
Two other major space powers, namely China and Russia,
have expressed interest in some form of international effort to
place curbs on the use of cyber-attack. 288 However, achieving
effective arms control for cyber-attack would be extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible, because of the problems associated with
identifying the perpetrators of such attacks. For example, al-
though the attacks on Pentagon computers in the "Moonlight
Maze" case were traced to a Russian Internet address,28 9 investi-
gators could not completely rule out the possibility that the at-
tacks were coming from elsewhere and were simply being
channeled through Russia. The problem is further complicated
by the fact that the perpetrators of cyber-attacks are not limited
to the traditional concept of uniformed military adversaries; 290
therefore, an attack launched against an AT&T satellite from
the territory of a "rogue state" (or "state of concern") may be an
armed attack by a hostile government or terrorist group, or sim-
ply the work of a mischievous hacker. Indeed, it is not always
287 DoDD 3100.10, supra note 4, at 6, 4.1-4.2.
288 SeeJ1. McCarthy, supra note 30.
1!- See DoDD 3100.10, supra note 4, at 1-2.
290 See supra text accompanying note 36.
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possible to determine that an attack has even taken place-
"[h]ostile actions against space systems... can be explained as
computer or software failure, even though either might be the
result of malicious acts."'291 Thus, given the stealthy nature of
cyber-attack, it is doubtful that even a "No-First-Use" type of
agreement among States would have any practical
significance .292
Multilateralism can certainly play an important role in cur-
tailing the activities of "nontraditional adversaries," which like-
wise threaten international peace and security, and there is, in
fact, movement in this direction. For instance, the Council of
Europe has already tabled a Draft Convention on Cyber
Crime;29 3 Russia too has made a formal proposal, via the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations, for "the development of 'an
international legal regime' to combat information crime and
terrorism. ' 29 4 However, there is a fine line between so-called
"nontraditional adversaries" and armed bands that are actually
acting on behalf of a hostile State-the latter being considered
an armed attack.295 Therefore, while these multilateral mea-
sures should be applauded, they do not displace the need for a
deterrence regime for cyber-space, which, because of the prob-
291 SPACE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
292 See generally NAGENDRA SINGH & EDWARD MCWHINNEY, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAw 318-319 (M. Nijhoff 1989) (discussing
the development in the 1960s of a proposed "No-First-Use" rule for nuclear
weapons).
293 See Common Position of 27 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis
of Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union, on negotiations relating to the
Draft Treaty on Cyber Crime held in the Council of Europe, 1999 O.J. (L 142) 1-
2 ; text of the Draft Treaty on Cyber Crime available at http://conventions.coe.
int/treaty/EN/cadreprojects.htm.
294 See McCarthy, supra note 30.
295 See DINSTEIN, supra note 131, at 181-183; see also supra note 248 and accom-
panying text; compare Nicaragua v. U.S., supra note 162, at 543 (Jennings, J., dis-
senting) ("It may readily be agreed that the mere provisions of arms cannot be
said to amount to an armed attack. But the provision of arms may, nevertheless,
be a very important element in what might be thought to amount to armed at-
tack, where it is coupled with other kinds of involvement. Accordingly, it seems
to me to say that provision of arms, coupled with 'logistical and other support' is
not armed attack is going much too far. Logistical support may itself be crucial.
According to the dictionary, logistics covers the 'art of moving, lodging, and sup-
plying troops and equipment'. . . If there is added to all this 'other support,' it
becomes difficult to understand what is, short of direct attack by a State's own
forces, that may not be done apparently without a lawful response in the form
of... self defense.").
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lem of asymmetry, must include the threat of a conventional
force response to be effective.
As a final point, it is important to note that the increased like-
lihood of "cyber-attack" on U.S. space systems is but one exam-
ple of the type of legal issues that are raised as U.S. military and
commercial space activities become increasingly interrelated.
Many other issues directly related to the convergence of military
and commercial space activities remain outstanding, including,
for example, the permissibility of military use of civil and com-
mercial space systems, and the legality of maintaining military
"shutter control" over commercial remote sensing satellites.
Resolving these questions through appropriate legal reforms
and/or clarification of the existing legal regime is clearly essen-
tial if the principle of cooperation in the exploration and use of
outer space, embodied in the Outer Space Treaty, is to be
upheld.
